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Abstract
REBECCA H. BEST: Negotiation in the Shadow of an Extremist Threat:
Insurgencies and the Internal Commitment Problem.
(Under the direction of Navin Bapat)
The effect of insurgent factionalization on peace process has become in recent years
a topic of much research. Although many insurgencies are not factionalized, those
that are include several long-running and highly visible conflicts - including those in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Northern Ireland, and Darfur. Much of this work has
assumed that when governments negotiate with an insurgent faction, they negotiate
with that faction which is least extreme in its preferences. In this dissertation, I
find support for the proposition that government decisions regarding which faction to
include in negotiations may be more influenced by the strength of the faction than by
that faction’s ideology. I also find that while factional preferences matter, they may
say more about when peace is possible than about which faction the government will
select as its negotiating partner.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“We will not allow these negotiations to pass over, and resistance will have its loud
voice as an answer to these land-selling negotiations.” - Abu Obaida, spokesman for
the al Qassam Brigades, Gaza City, September 1, 2010.1
This dissertation examines the process of crafting peace agreements between a
state and a divided, or factionalized insurgency, and the causes of both successful
implementation and failure of such agreements. More specifically, it addresses the
reasons why violence sometimes increases around peace negotiations in such conflicts
(Kydd and Walter 2002; Bueno de Mesquita 2005) and why, given that attempts
at peace seem to have the perverse effect of instead producing more violence, states
continue to negotiate with armed opposition groups. I propose that to answer these
questions, we need to change the way that we study and conceive of factionalized in-
surgencies. Rather than continuing with the common conception of insurgent factions
as being either “moderate” or “extremist,” we need to begin to think more carefully
about what goals these different factions have. I argue that what really divides fac-
tions is not the intensity of their preferences, but the substance of those preferences.
This in turn suggests that the reason violence increases in response to negotiations is
that factions that are not included in those negotiations fear that their own distinct
1Quoted in “Armed Groups Vow Israel Attacks,” Al Jazeera, September 3, 2010.
interests will not be protected by any resulting peace agreement. In the chapters that
follow, I present this case as well as my conclusion that states continue to negotiate
in the face of potential increases in insurgent violence because the mistrust between
factions with different goals allows the state to divide those factions by manipulat-
ing their preference divergences and eventually achieve peace (or at least a greatly
weakened opposition movement) at a lower cost.
An insurgency is factionalized when it consists of multiple sub-groups, or factions,
that have different goals or use different means by which to achieve those goals. The
Palestinian movement is one such factionalized insurgency, the component groups of
which include Hamas, Fatah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Abu Nidal Organization,
the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the PFLP-General Com-
mand, and the Palestinian Liberation Front. In the quote above, a spokesman for the
militant wing of the Hamas party responds to an agreement between the Israeli gov-
ernment and Hamas’ primary rival within Palestine, Fatah. Hamas and Fatah have
long been the most powerful of the many factions within the Palestinian movement.
Hamas, which seeks a religious Palestinian state and has long denied Israel’s right
to exist, has a history of violent opposition to peace talks and agreements between
the secular Fatah group and Israel. Hamas’ opposition to peace talks has been cited
as one of the barriers to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Palestine and
Israel (Kydd and Walter 2002, 2006; Pearlman 2008).
Some opposition factions may exist purely or predominantly for the purposes
of efficiency - where one faction operates as a militant group and another as the
movement’s political arm, such as the past relationship between the IRA and the
Irish Republican political party Sinn Fe´in.2 Other movements become factionalized
2Siqueira (2005) models the relationship and interactions between militant and political factions
of a common movement to determine when movements with this sort of factional division are most
successful and efficient.
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due to differences in ideology or loyalties to rival leaders. Ideological differences
characterize the division between Hamas and Fatah - both Palestinian factions seek
an independent Palestinian state, but they have different conceptions of how such a
state should be governed. Where factions arise as a result of ideological or leadership
differences, factions may still be able to cooperate against the government to some
degree, these types of factions often result in inter-necine violence such as the conflicts
within Palestine that followed Hamas’ 2006 electoral victory in Gaza. In the wake of
the elections, fighting between Hamas and Fatah was so intense that the International
Committee of the Red Cross estimated that 116 died as a result of factional fighting
in Gaza City during the course of a single week in the summer of 2007, (International
Committee for the Red Cross, 2007). The effects of the divisions between Hamas
and Fatah extend beyond the deaths and destruction that their fighting brings within
Palestine. The divisions among Palestine’s myriad factions, parties, and splinter
groups mean that the Palestinian movement cannot operate as a single cohesive entity
in negotiations with Israel or with states and international aid organizations.
Like the Palestinians, there are several other insurgent populations that are di-
vided by differing factional loyalties. Examples of divided or factionalized insurgen-
cies include the Irish Republican Army (IRA) factions include the Provisional IRA
(PIRA), the Real IRA (RIRA), the Continuity IRA (CIRA); the primary actors in
the Shiite insurgency in Iraq were the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization; Iraq’s
Sunni insurgents are divided between many groups including al-Qaeda in the Land
of the Two Rivers, Ansar al-Islam, and various Sunni nationalists groups; rebels in
the Darfur region of Sudan comprise the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),
the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdel Wahid faction (SLA-Wahid), the Sudan Liber-
ation Army-Minni Minnawi faction (SLA-M), and others; the Algerian opposition
consisted of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Call and Com-
mand (GSPC), the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and other smaller groups. These
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are only a few of the world’s recent and ongoing factionalized insurgencies. Not all
insurgencies are factionalized, but the extensive and often violent nature of the divi-
sions between the factions of these highly visible movements suggests the significance
of considering how factionalization of armed opposition groups affects the course of
the broader opposition movement and attempts at negotiating peace.
When ideological differences divide insurgencies, the resulting divisions limit the
range of settlements that would be acceptable to all actors, causing spoilers to arise
and use violence to prevent the implementation of resolutions. Where insurgencies
are factionalized, governments frequently craft deals with only one or a subset of the
insurgent factions. Governments may exclude a faction because it is believed to be
militarily or politically weak, because its demands are inconsistent with those of other
factions the government prefers to work with, because it is perceived as extreme in
its demands or insincere in its willingness to negotiate. In insurgencies that consist
of many splinters and factions, it may simply be infeasible to gather representatives
from all of the loosely defined factions for peace talks. Pearlman writes, “A peace
agreement, or even the prospect of a peace agreement, can heighten contestation over
the terms of legitimate representation [within a nonstate group] because it favors
some factions and disfavors others” (2008, 84). I contend that the prospect of peace
is particularly likely to heighten contestation between factions when those factions
have substantively significant divergences in ideology and policy goals.
As the ideological preferences of the factions diverge, mistrust between the fac-
tions increases. A faction that receives government concessions can be expected to
implement those concessions in ways that promote its own policies, members, or ideol-
ogy. When factions have significant ideological differences, a faction that is excluded
from a peace deal that advantages its rival will not be inclined to trust that, if it
disarms and acquiesces to the peace, the rival’s subsequent policies or distribution
of the benefits of the peace deal will benefit the excluded faction. The divergent
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preferences between different factions create a commitment problem internal to the
insurgency. Where preferences are sufficiently divergent, this commitment problem
manifests as spoiler violence against either the faction that is cooperating with the
government or against both that faction and the government. Empirically, it has
been shown that peace deals are often met with violence from those parties that are
excluded from the deal. While violence against the state has often been addressed by
theories of spoiler violence (examples include Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2002;
Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Pearlman 2005), it is also evident that fighting between
insurgent factions often accompanies attempts at peace. A recent example of this is
the United States’ attempt to resolve the Iraqi insurgency by co-opting former Sunni
insurgents to help contain the insurgency and fight on behalf of a future Iraqi state.
These Sons of Iraq became targets for both Sunni and Shiite militias because of the
deal they struck with the government. Likewise, animosity between the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) and those factions that rejected the Oslo Accords,
including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, increased following the signing of the
Accords.
When insurgencies are factionalized, some faction or factions will be disadvan-
taged by any peace deal, which in turn may lead to violence designed to spoil that
peace. Therefore the presence and nature of factions within an opposition can be
said to shape both the course of peace talks as well as the prospects for successful
implementation of any peace deal. The empirical implications of modeling faction-
alized insurgencies with multidimensional preferences are multiple. As mentioned
previously, when we move the discussion of spoiler violence beyond the black box of
extremism, it becomes clear that groups excluded from negotiations may respond to
negotiations, or government concessions to rival factions, with violence directed at
the rival factions. Spoiler violence then may be directed within the insurgency. For
an example of this sort of effect from the conflict over Palestine, consider the graph in
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Figure 1.1 below.3 Note that the violent events as a percentage of dyadic events be-
tween Palestinian groups (represented by the blue line in the graph) tend to increase
following negotiations between the Palestinian leadership (Palestinian Liberation Or-
ganization (PLO) or Palestinian Authority (PA)) and the Israeli government.
Figure 1.1: Violence as a Percentage of Dyadic Events, 1989-2009
I have established that factionalization is present in opposition movements in-
volved in some of the world’s more intense and long-running civil conflicts, therefore
we can conclude that the problems associated with factionalization and the prospects
for peacefully resolving civil conflicts are somewhat prevalent in cases of civil conflict.
This dissertation aims at furthering our understanding of how the internal politics
of an insurgency, the relationships and interactions among components of that in-
surgency, shape strategic interactions with the government. In particular, I propose
3Graph created using the “Levant Reuters CAMEO Data” from the Penn State Events Data
Project (2009).
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an answer to the question of how the existence of policy differences among multiple
insurgent factions affects the possibilities for and stability of peace resolutions.
The project proceeds in several chapters. In Chapter two, I provide an overview
of the literature on factionalized insurgencies, extremism, and commitment problems
and identify the absence of focused research on the effect of ideological divisions
between insurgent factions and other factional characteristics as a gap in the literature
of peace processes in factionalized civil conflicts. I then develop the puzzles that
motivate this project, specifically why does the level of violence often seem to increase
rather than decrease in response to peace talks and agreements and why, despite this,
do governments continue to negotiate with insurgents. Chapter two concludes with
an overview of the general theory I propose.
Having introduced the general theory in Chapter two, in Chapter three, I for-
malize and derive empirical implications from a model of interaction between two
insurgent factions that have some exogenous level of common interest and a target
government which can choose one of these factions with which to negotiate and can
set an endogenous level of concessions to offer in return for that faction’s acquies-
cence. I assume for the purposes of the model that factions are distinguished from
one another by their individual costs of conflict and their relative power. I assume
that factions of a common insurgency each have some utility for territory under the
control of the rival faction (as opposed to the control of the state), but I assume that
this utility is determined by the level of common interest between the factions, or the
similarity of the factions’ ideologies. I present the model’s solution along with my
own hypotheses regarding spoiler violence and its implications for state negotiations
with divided insurgencies.
In Chapter four, I apply comparative case study methods to cross-temporal evi-
dence drawn from four distinct periods of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to evaluate
the central hypotheses I derive from the model in Chapter three. I chose the four
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cases presented in Chapter four intentionally such that they would exhibit variation
on the two independent variables, which capture the power balance between factions
and the degree of ideological difference between factions, across the cases.
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Chapter 2
Current Literature and Remaining Puzzles
There are multiple theories of civil war resolution - Walter (2002) provides an excel-
lent review of six such theories and introduces a seventh. It is not my intention to
provide a comprehensive review of the existing literature on civil war resolution and
spoiler violence. Instead, in the following paragraphs, I will position my own the-
ory of a variable intra-group commitment problem within the context of the current
scholarship and present the alternative hypotheses that this scholarship suggests in a
manner that will allow for an easy comparison of my own hypotheses with those of
earlier work. My theory combines the concept of commitment problems with that of
factionalization to consider the effect of multiple insurgent factions and the ideolog-
ical distance between those factions on the potential for conflict resolution. I argue
that commitment problems and factionalization, long understood as a hindrance to
successful conflict resolution, together may create an opportunity for settlements be-
tween an opposition faction and a targeted state for a resolution that would otherwise
not be possible. Below I provide an overview of the extant literatures on commitment
problems in civil war and on the ways that factionalization influences the course of an
insurgency and affects prospects for peace. I then identify two closely related puzzles
that remain in these veins of research and propose an answer for those puzzles.
A significant branch of the civil war literature suggests that commitment prob-
lems, or the inability of one party to credibly commit ex ante to share resources or
not to take advantage of the other once it gains more power, are to blame for the
difficulty of arriving at peaceful resolutions to civil conflicts (Walter 2002, 2003, 2009,
Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, Azam and Mesnard 2003, and Fearon 2004). Com-
mitment problems may result from change in an actor’s preferences (Strotz 1956) or
from an actor’s disincentive to fulfill a promise once that promise has already pro-
duced a desired action from another player (Schelling 1956). Schelling writes “both
the kidnapper who would like to release his prisoner, and the prisoner, may search
desperately for a way to commit the latter against informing on his captor, without
finding one” (299). While the prisoner wants to be freed, and knows that to be freed
he must convince the captor he will not inform the police, the prisoner cannot com-
mit to acting against his own interests in turning the captor in once the captor has
released him.
Commitment problems are especially detrimental to peace in civil conflicts be-
cause as groups disarm and engage in the peace process and government formation
they become more vulnerable to potentially devastating attacks. Walter (2002) il-
lustrates that it is the inability of both parties to a civil war (but particularly the
state) to credibly commit to disarming and carrying out the provisions of a peace
agreement that most often hinders the implementation of a signed peace agreement.
She argues that commitment problems between insurgents and a state can only be
overcome through third party security guarantees to verify compliance (and enforce
compliance where there is high asymmetry in capabilities) and power-sharing agree-
ments. Kirschner (2010) suggests that commitment problems are especially great in
civil conflicts characterized by a history of violence and in contexts where discrimi-
nation is high and identification of outgroup members is easy. These factors intensify
commitment problems because they reduce faith in agreements and increase the risks
to each side of disarming or complying when the opposing side may not uphold its
side of an agreement.
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A parallel branch of the literature on civil conflicts and terrorism identifies the
factionalization of opposition groups - be they insurgencies or terrorist movements -
as a factor that further complicates attempts at negotiating and implementing peace
settlements (Kydd and Walter 2002; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Pearlman 2008; Cun-
ningham 2011). Factions can arise for any of a variety of reasons. Some factions
may form purely for strategic or tactical reasons, as with organizations that consist
of separate political and militant factions or organizations that are divided in order
to limit damage in the event that the leadership of one faction is captured. Siqueira
writes that “although there may be agreement among [the factions] as to what might
be the broad political objectives of the movement each may have different opinions
as to how to go about achieving them” (2005, 218). In other cases, factions may
arise because of substantive differences among the members of the opposition. While
all members of the opposition population may desire a replacement of the existing
government in their territory for example, rather than differing primarily in their
strategy for removing the present government, they may differ in their preferences
regarding a replacement for the government. When factions form due to substantive
differences, it may be more difficult to find a peace settlement that is acceptable to
all factions.
When movements are factionalized there may be an array of individual groups,
each with a distinct set of demands, and each with its own support base. Cunningham
notes that in many conflicts it can be difficult at the outset of negotiations for a state
to determine which of these factions must be included for a peace settlement to
succeed (2011). Each group has an incentive to claim that its support is broader and
its capabilities greater than they actually are in order to gain a seat at the bargaining
table and a greater claim in any eventual concessions or offer of peace. Since armed
opposition groups are illegal, their members are not likely to be easily counted (if
they were, they would be that much easier to capture or kill). Thus, the claims group
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leaders make with regard to capabilities and popular support are not easily verified.
Factions and splinters are often the result of disputes regarding policy or ideology,
which means that the demands of various factions are likely to be somewhat different
- and may even be mutually exclusive. All of this complicates the bargaining process
by increasing the number of actors and increasing uncertainty regarding which actors
the state must appease in order to achieve peace and what sorts of offers might be
able to appease all of the required factions simultaneously.
An understanding of the effects of factionalization is critical to developing our
understanding of why and when peace agreements fail and when and how such agree-
ments can be crafted for successful implementation. This is because, as established
in the previous chapter, not all insurgencies are monolithic. Instead, some insur-
gencies are characterized by factionalization and splintering. Pearlman argues that
often within conflict settings a system of representation of the opposition is not well
established, leading to factionalization and contestation over representation of the
movement (2008).
Much of the existing work conceptualizes factionalization as taking place along
a continuum (or, occasionally, on a dichotomy) of moderate to extremist factions
(among others, Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2002, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita 2005;
Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007). Typically, the so-called moderate factions (or,
in Stedman’s typology, the limited spoilers) are characterized as those factions that
are open to negotiating with the state or would be willing to accept a compromise
peace. On the extremist end of the spectrum lie those factions (Stedman’s total spoil-
ers) that are unwilling to negotiate or accept any compromise agreement (Bueno de
Mesquita 2005; Stedman 1997). As an example, Bueno de Mesquita (2005) applies
the concept of the commitment problem in the context of terrorist campaigns, find-
ing that, in negotiations with terrorist movements, the existence of multiple factions
may allow states to overcome the barrier that the commitment problem presents for
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negotiations if the state does not negotiate with all factions of the movement. Bueno
de Mesquita assumes that there is some contingent of the movement that is “mod-
erate,” or open to negotiations, and some contingent that is “extremist,” or closed
to the idea of compromise. Under this framework, the state simply negotiates with
the moderate faction, while the extremist faction remains armed, thereby ensuring
that the state maintains an incentive to carry out its side of the deal with the mod-
erate faction. Bueno de Mesquita underlines the potential for a government to pull
so-called moderate terrorists to the negotiating table by encouraging the growth of
their challengers - thereby forcing the hand of the moderates such that they need
the government’s assistance to maintain their status, but he does not fully examine
the potential for a commitment problem to exist within the insurgency or terrorist
movement when the rival factions do not share the same interests or the potential for
factional cooperation when there is extensive common interest among the factions.
The work on factionalization often emphasizes the complications that additional
factions bring to peace processes by either reducing the set of agreements that are
acceptable to all actors (Cunningham 2006) or through the potential for spoiler vi-
olence due to extremist preferences in some factions (Kydd and Walter 2002 among
others).1 The spoiler violence literature which focuses on the moderate-extremist di-
vide implicitly restricts itself to factions holding different preferences along a single
1As mentioned above, Bueno de Mesquita (2005), who, while predicting that the presence of
extremist factions in a terrorist movement will lead to a sustained increase in violence following
negotiations, does not suggest that this makes an agreement harder to achieve, is an exception. He
suggests that without a faction that will not participate in negotiations, the moderates within a
movement will never trust the government not to renege and will therefore never conclude a peace
deal.
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issue dimension.2 Proponents of the spoiler violence explanation for failure of con-
flict resolution have argued that spoilers use violence to cause the state to question
either the capability or willingness of its negotiating partner to constrain the remain-
ing factions of the opposition. Spoilers therefore aim to convince the state that the
concessions it has made to its moderate negotiating partner are insufficient to quell
the violence.3
Where groups hold preferences on multiple issues, moderate and extremist labels
become less meaningful and it is possible for the state to make offers to different groups
on different issues (rather than using a single offer to distinguish the moderate from
the extreme as Cunningham (2011) proposes). These offers of concessions may incite
violence from rival factions either because they are insufficient or because the nature of
the offer is objectionable to the rival factions. An offer made to one faction may lower
the utility of a rival faction if the interests of the factions are sufficiently different.
Consider a factionalized opposition in which both factions desire independence and
self-rule for their shared geographic area. The factions may differ on their preferences
regarding what the governance of that area would look like - for example, one faction
may desire a democratic system while the other might want a theocracy. The target
state may be able to offer to the former limited autonomy under an elected council or,
to the latter, limited self-rule by a council of clerics. Because the secondary preferences
of the groups are mutually exclusive, either group may be willing to accept a little
less than it would otherwise because it knows the government could make an offer
to its rival. In the context of different preferences on multiple issues, factions may
2With, for example, two issue dimensions we could expect that while there might be a faction
that is more “extreme” on both, there might also be factions that take an “extreme” position on only
one issue. As the number of relevant issues increases, the number of possible issue-based factional
divisions also increases. As the factions that take “extreme” views on some, but not all, issues
increase, it becomes less and less meaningful to refer to “extreme” and “moderate” factions as these
labels are relative to individual issues.
3Pearlman adds that many spoilers have an additional goal of shifting the balance of power within
the broader opposition movement (2008).
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accept lower offers since they know that the state can pay off another faction. Where
factional preferences are in opposition on a particular issue, an offer to one faction
can be detrimental to another faction.
In this vein, Nilsson argues that the involvement of multiple factions in a conflict
increases the state’s willingness to offer deals to weaker factions “reducing the number
of fronts on which it is fighting” and weak groups may moderate their own demands
to make getting a deal more likely (2010, 254). Nilsson finds that, ceteris paribus,
peace agreements are more likely to be signed with weak factions as the number of
factions increases. Like Nilsson, I adhere to the assumption that armed groups, as
rational actors, will accept state concessions that leave them at least as well off as
they can expect to be by continuing to fight - which suggests that weaker groups
should accept lower payoffs. My theory differs from Nilsson’s in that, rather than
only reducing the number of fighting fronts, I allow states to take advantage of the
commitment problem between factions, co-opting one faction to fight another. Also,
rather than focusing on the number of factions as a critical causal variable, I assume
two factions and allow the degree of common interest between the factions to vary -
capturing the severity of the commitment problem between the factions. As a result,
where Nilsson expects that weaker factions will be more likely to receive offers as the
number of factions increases, I anticipate that stronger factions will be more likely to
receive offers as they are more likely to be able to resist the remaining factions, but
as the factions become more united, offers from the government must in turn increase
because united factions have a higher utility for war.
Factional divisions represent differences in the preferences of a movement. There-
fore, factions provide an opportunity for the government to learn more about the
preferences and reservation points, or that point beyond which an actor will not ac-
cept a deal, of the different components of the insurgency and to manipulate those
components through strategic concessions. The presence of factions and the responses
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of those factions to government concessions reveal information about the movement
and about what concessions are necessary to achieve peace (Cunningham, 2011).
Cunningham allows states to use concessions strategically to determine the true pref-
erences of factions (that is, which factions are using demands for independence to
bargain for more limited concessions and which are more sincere in their demands)
and to limit the number of factions they are facing. Thus, the offer of concessions
can be part of the bargaining process. Cunningham promotes her “divide and con-
cede” logic over the traditional “divide and conquer” approach whereby states avoid
making concessions to factionalized groups because the factions do not have common
demands and cannot constrain each other from using violence, so a concession made
to one or several groups will not end the conflict. I build on Cunningham’s logic that
concessions can be “part of the bargaining process, rather than just a potential end
point” by suggesting that states also use concessions for the purpose of manipulating
the rifts between factions and inciting intra-group conflict (278).
2.1 What is Missing from the Literature?
Much of the previous literature on spoiler violence argues or assumes that spoilers’
extreme preferences drive their actions. The proposition that, as much of the previous
literature argues or assumes, spoilers’ actions are driven by their extreme preferences
raises as many questions as it answers. What are extreme preferences? What is it that
causes spoilers to oppose peace when conflict is costly? Why do some factions within
an insurgency have moderate preferences, which seem to be indicated by a willingness
to negotiate with the government toward a peaceful resolution, while other factions
have extreme preferences? If spoilers do play a significant role in preventing peace,
understanding the origins of their preference for the continuation of conflict may allow
decision makers in the state to produce a more efficient and durable settlement.
The literature does not provide one common understanding of what it means
for a faction to have extreme preferences. Earlier, I referenced Bueno de Mesquita’s
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conception of extremists; more specifically, Bueno de Mesquita distinguishes the mod-
erates from extremists by “the extent to which they value defeating the government”
(150). It is certainly conceivable that some would gain a degree of personal utility
from deposing a hated regime. But Bueno de Mesquita does not address the reasons
for this difference in intensity of preference. It is not necessary to the development
of a formal model to establish the reasons that actors hold the preferences that they
do, but a clear understanding of the preferences of actors allows for more well-defined
and accurate payoff structures and, ultimately, a more reliable result. Stedman (1997)
and Kydd and Walter (2002) among others are more limited in their conception of
the difference between moderates and extremists (or limited and total spoilers). Both
suggest that extremists (total spoilers) are disadvantaged by peace, but are not spe-
cific as to the nature of this disadvantage.
Lake (2002) offers a more satisfying definition: “First, extremists hold political
positions that, in any distribution of opinion, lie in one of the ‘tails.’ In other words,
their political beliefs are not widely shared even within their own societies. Second,
extremists currently lack the means or power to obtain their goals” (18). While the
first piece of this definition is somewhat vague, it does identify extremists as a minor-
ity party (which raises questions concerning those cases where the parties identified
as more extreme - such as ZANU and ZAPU relative to the UANC in the Rhodesian
civil conflict - are also the more powerful). The second piece of Lake’s definition how-
ever hints at his thesis. In short, Lake proposes that extremist violence is intended to
shift the bargaining range in favor of the extremists and away from the state and the
“ ‘moderate’ terrorists with well-defined and limited political aims somewhat more
widely shared within their societies” (18). Lake does not argue that extremists must
be uncompromising or that they prefer war to peace - merely that it is in their interest
to delay peace while they attempt to increase their own political leverage. In short,
Lake’s answer to the question of why extremists prefer conflict despite its costs is that
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they hope through conflict to achieve a better payoff for peace in the future. Lake’s
general argument is very compelling, but he still relies on the moderate - extremist
divide, which in turn artificially limits the political platforms that insurgencies can
adopt to a single spectrum. Because opposition groups often hold positions on a va-
riety of issues, a single left to right, or moderate to extreme, representation of their
positions may not be adequate for understanding how and why states chose negoti-
ating partners and, in turn, when we can expect to see successful implementation of
agreements and when agreements will be challenged by rival opposition fractions.
This dissertation addresses the implications of allowing greater ideological and po-
litical diversity between factions of an insurgency - thereby abandoning the traditional
conception of terrorists or insurgents as being confined to a moderate to extremist
continuum. In doing this, I consider two more specific puzzles. The literatures on
spoiling behavior, types of spoilers, and reasons for spoiling, as well as the related
literature on radicalization of violent non-state actors, indicate that peace processes
in civil war are often marked by an increase or spike in the violence of those conflicts.
Various explanations for this rise in violence have been proffered, but the persis-
tence of the phenomenon raises the question at the heart of the first puzzle to which
the theory elaborated here speaks, why do states continue to try to negotiate peace
settlements with insurgents when such attempts are so often met with bloodshed?
Previous explanations for the rise in violence surrounding negotiations rely on the
assumption that factions that negotiate with the state are moderates, while those
factions that oppose negotiations and use violence to spoil negotiations are extrem-
ists. Extremists are assumed to spoil because they are opposed to a peace that does
not cede to them all their demands or because they have a preference for violence.
Even Lake writes, “An extremist lacks broad backing but nonetheless wants what is
beyond reach and refuses to settle for less” (2002, 18). However, because war destroys
resources, we know that it is ex post inefficient. Therefore, there should always be
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some negotiated settlement, some division of the resources prior to their destruction,
that will leave each actor at least as well off as they could expect to be at the end of a
war (Fearon 1995). This leads me to the second motivating puzzle of my theory: why
do we see spoiler violence if not as the result or manifestation of an uncompromising
extremism? How can we reconcile the violence that marks attempts at civil war res-
olution with a rational view of war as an inefficient means of dividing and allocating
resources?
This project reconsiders the concept of extremism and the spoiler violence phe-
nomena in a rational choice framework while challenging the assumptions of previous
work. Others have argued that extreme factions or, in Stedman’s typology, “total
spoilers” consist of those members of the opposition who are unwilling to accept any
compromise agreement (Stedman 1997). This assumes that extremists’ first prefer-
ence is for their ideal outcome and that they are at best indifferent among all other
outcomes (or at worst, that, failing to achieve their ideal outcome, they prefer death
and destruction). Extremists with a very low probability of prevailing against the
government then will continue to fight regardless of any compromise offer made to
them by the government. Extremists, therefore, must see the good for which they are
fighting as indivisible, while moderates see their goal as divisible.4 But, why would
two actors see the same good (whether territory, policy, or something else) in such
different lights? If a difference in views of the divisibility of a commonly sought good
is not the reason for the distinction between moderates and extremists, then we are
no closer to understanding extremism.
4It is worth noting here that Lake represents as exception to this, writing that extremists “seek
to use terror to provoke the target into a disproportionate response that radicalizes moderates and
drives them into the arms of the terrorists, expanding their supporters and base” (2002, 16). In
short, Lake argues that extremists use terror not because they are opposed to any settlement, but
because they hope to shift the bargaining range in their favor. Pearlman furthers this logic with her
internal contestation theory that states that the purpose of much of the spoiler violence we see is to
“shape the balance of power among the forces that make up a nonstate group” (2008, 105).
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2.2 An Alternative
The argument presented here extends and builds upon the work begun by Walter,
Bueno de Mesquita, Lake, and others in significant ways. First, while I address the
effects of factionalization on an opposition, rather than assuming that the state always
negotiates with the less extreme faction, I endogenize the government’s choice of a
faction with which to negotiate. Consistent with Fearon’s (1995) findings, I contend
that there should never be a faction that is firmly opposed on principle to negotiating
with the state, what Stedman (1997) dubs a “total spoiler” or a faction with demands
so high that the government cannot meet them. As Fearon demonstrates, the demands
of a rational group will be conditioned by that group’s expectations from continued
conflict, as will the demands of the state. Second, I consider the implications of
commitment problems for peace processes in civil conflicts, but my primary concern
is with the commitment problem between opposition factions, rather than between
the government and the opposition.5
While great progress has been made in our understanding the effect of faction-
alization on peace processes in civil war through the conception of moderate and
extremist factions, there are many benefits to changing this conception to one more
reflective of reality. When insurgents are divided in terms of their intensity of pref-
erence for a common goal, as some of the previous work has assumed, then any offer
that satisfies the more extreme faction will also satisfy the moderate faction. An offer
to satisfy the most extremists may not be feasible, and a solution such as Cunning-
ham’s divide and concede approach is very attractive in such a setting. However,
when insurgents simply have different goals or prioritize different issue areas, a state
may find that it can choose the issue on which it prefers to negotiate or the faction
with which it prefers to negotiate. In such a case, where factional demands vary in
5It is worth noting that Bueno de Mesquita suggests the strategic interaction between terrorist
factions as an area worthy of future research.
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type as well as degree, we can expect that other factors will determine which faction
a state ultimately attempts to make peace with and what the result of that peace
process is. Specifically, I propose that factors such as how similar or dissimilar the
faction’s ideologies are and factional strength are likely to play a role in determining
both who is invited to the bargaining table and how peace negotiations result.
I argue that spoiler violence is the result, not of preferences for violence or prefer-
ences that are so “extreme” as to eliminate the bargaining space between the spoiler
and the government, but of a difference in preferences among factions that diminishes
each faction’s expectations for the benefits it will gain from any share of contested
territory that its rival is able to capture from the government. By dropping the as-
sumption of extreme preferences, I find that factionalization actually presents the
government with an opportunity to achieve peace more efficiently than it might with
a unified opposition. When factions differ in their ideological or policy preferences,
rather than only in the level of fervor with which they promote those preferences,
factionalization allows the government to incite in-fighting that can weaken the in-
surgency - and particularly that faction of the insurgency that is not cooperating
with the government. Factionalization allows the government an opportunity to build
something closer to a minimum winning coalition (that is, paying off only as much
of the opposition as it needs to in order to shift the expected outcome farther in its
own favor).
Much of the previous work on commitment problems in civil conflict resolution is
implicitly restricted to the existence of such problems between an opposition group
and a state. Where factionalized oppositions have been considered, they have, by and
large, been characterized as consisting of members who vary in their level of ideo-
logical commitment or in their pragmatism (among others, Stedman 1997; Bueno de
Mesquita 2005; Kydd and Walter 1997). However, multiple opposition groups with
overlapping, but not identical, goals characterize many contemporary civil conflicts,
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including those in Palestine, Northern Ireland, Iraq, and Uganda. The ideological and
political divisions within opposition movements that produce factions can also be ex-
pected to produce commitment problems, the severity of which should increase as
the rival factions’ goals become more mutually exclusive and more divergent. Chang-
ing the locus of the commitment problem to represent interactions between factions,
rather than between the opposition and the government, both better reflects the re-
ality of many cases and changes the expectations that models of conflict resolution
produce. Intra-group commitment problems create additional incentives for each fac-
tion to negotiate with the government - that is to gain control of resources that
might otherwise end up under the control of the rival faction. They also increase the
credibility of a faction that agrees to constrain rival opposition factions in exchange
for government concessions. Separately, factionalization and commitment problems
may hinder progress toward the negotiation and implementation of a civil war settle-
ment, but when commitment problems occur between factions of an opposition, they
may have the opposite effect by increasing the range of circumstances under which a
settlement offered by the state will be accepted by an opposition faction.
In this manuscript I present a new argument for the origins of spoiler violence. I
argue that what we have long called extremism is often the manifestation of divergent
preferences among insurgent factions that causes each faction to anticipate gaining
less from its rival’s control of contested territory than it would if preferences were
more similar. While factions of an insurgency may all prefer that the insurgency take
control of the contested territory from the government, each faction will prefer that
it be the faction in charge of administering the territory. Those who spoil peace do
so because the negotiated settlement disadvantages them relative to the gains they
expect to make from continued conflict (that is, if they continue to fight they stand
a greater chance of either wresting territory from the government through conflict or
gaining government concessions for themselves). If the faction receiving concessions
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could credibly commit to sharing control of the ceded territory with the faction ex-
cluded from negotiations once the excluded faction has disarmed, then spoiling could
potentially be avoided. Where this internal commitment problem exists however, it
creates incentives for spoiler violence. This understanding of the origins of spoiler
violence suggests that spoiler violence and fragmentation of insurgencies actually
presents governments with an opportunity for resolving or disentangling themselves
from civil conflicts at a lower cost than they might when facing a consolidated insur-
gency.
To see the effect of differences in policy preferences, consider the Iraqi Shi’ite
insurgency of 2003 and 2004. The well-established Supreme Council for Islamic Rev-
olution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its armed wing, the Badr Organization, was well-armed,
organized, and equipped to defend the interests of Iraqi Shi’ites in the face of Sunni
threats both in the political arena and on the battlefield. SCIRI was able to gain a
seat at the table to take part in the new Iraqi political process, and the large Shi’ite
population in the country put it in a strong position. But, the Shi’ites had split
following the 2003 Coalition invasion, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army came out
against both the Provisional Authority, SCIRI, and the Badr Organization. Sadr’s
attempts to spoil the peace and his attacks against both the Coalition and other
Shi’ites led led them to label him as an extremist opposed to any compromise. But,
from another perspective, it is clear that the differences between Sadr and SCIRI
were not differences of degree of fervor, but qualitative differences in their preferred
outcomes. SCIRI was subject to heavy influence from Iran. Many of the top leaders
were Iraqis who had lived in exile in Iran for much of Saddam’s rule. Sadr appealed
to those Shi’ite Iraqis who had remained in Iraq and suffered greatly throughout the
rule of Saddam. Sadr’s recruits were largely from the poorest areas of southern Iraq’s
cities. They were motivated by feelings of nationalism and class divisions - they mis-
trusted SCIRI for its Iranian influences and because they did not believe that it could
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adequately represent the interests of the poorest classes.
In this light, the Mahdi Army can be viewed not as extremists who would not
settle for representation by the SCIRI leadership in a new government, but as a group
that feared being cut out of the political process entirely to be represented nominally
by a group that did not share its position in society, history, or concerns for the
future of Iraq (the latter fear reflecting the nationalism of the Mahdi Army). We can
understand the Sadrist movement then as one that occurred not because its members
views were a more extreme version of those shared by SCIRI, but as an organization
that stood to lose its chance for influence if the peace went through according to terms
that identified the SCIRI as the representative of the Shi’ite population. This suggests
that the opposition toward peace settlements by groups like the Mahdi Army may
not be because they believe the concessions involved are not sufficiently extensive,
but because the concessions do not address their particular concerns. It seems likely
that the Mahdi Army feared that if SCIRI were recognized as the representative of
all Iraqi Shi’ites, the interests of those who had suffered under Saddam - and were
less wealthy and well-educated as a result - would not be protected.
The differences that separate factions of an insurgency and produce mistrust and
commitment problems between those factions present an opportunity for their target
states. While much of the previous literature has considered factionalization as an
impediment to the resolution of civil conflicts, I argue that these very divisions, of
which spoiler violence is often a symptom, can increase the range of conditions under
which target states can make offers of concessions that will be accepted by at least
one of the factions. Spoiler violence can have disastrous consequences for a peace
process if it indicates that the non-state participants in the process are not credible
in their agreement with the government or if it undermines the state’s confidence in
the non-state actor as a negotiating partner. But, when target states understand the
divisions between factions and the causes of spoiler violence, they may be able to
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achieve a peaceful resolution by transferring to one faction the resources necessary to
disarm a rival faction.
While the state might consider circumventing this problem by dividing the con-
cessions between the factions in accordance to what those factions could expect to
receive from continued fighting, there are problems with this approach. In particular,
this paper addresses the greater utility the state may gain from granting a lower level
of concessions to one faction, thereby inducing spoiler violence, than it would from
making a higher total transfer of concessions divided between the factions in order
to secure peace. Spoiler violence can have different targets: some spoiler violence is
directed at the state to convince the state that its negotiating partner is not credi-
ble, while other spoiler violence takes the form of conflict between factions designed
to deter a faction from cooperating. Where there is sufficient distance between the
preferred outcomes of the factions, a target state may be able to make an offer of
concessions to one faction that gives that faction the resources it needs to disarm or
constrain the remaining faction. In this way, the state can take advantage of the divi-
siveness within the insurgency, and the damper this puts on the insurgents’ ability to
combine their fighting strength effectively when they know that disarming the state
will mean that they are left to vie with each other for control of the new government.
The state can extract itself from the conflict at a cost lower than that required to
continue the conflict or satisfy both factions.
Consider a target government facing two factions of a separatist movement, where
the separatist factions have different preferences on some issue. The degree of diver-
gence between the preferred outcomes of the two factions may be great or small. The
target government may decide to make some offer of concessions to one of the factions
to secure that faction’s cooperation in repressing the remaining faction. The faction
cooperating with the state may wish to persuade the excluded faction to disarm by
offering it a share of the spoils of negotiation once it does so, but, if the excluded
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faction disarms, the included faction would no longer have any incentive to share
resources. The differing preferences of the two factions indicate that any resources
shared with the rival may be used in ways that diminish the utility the included
faction obtains. A faction included in negotiations with the state cannot credibly
commit to sharing the concessions with the faction excluded from negotiations once
that faction has disarmed. The only benefit that a faction excluded from negotiations
can hope to receive from acquiescing is in the policies implemented by the faction in-
cluded in negotiations. When there is great divergence between the factions’ policy
goals, this benefit will be quite small.
This suggests that spoiler violence results when factions of an insurgency have
very different goals and the state makes an offer to one faction that would advantage
that faction at the expense of its rival. A faction receiving concessions from the state
cannot credibly commit to protecting the interests of the excluded faction once the
excluded faction has disarmed. In other words, what often appear to be extremist
preferences for continued violence are actually manifestations of the internal commit-
ment problem. Weaker factions should be more willing to accept government offers
since they have less to gain from any potential rebel victory (as most of the spoils
from such a victory would go to the faction with the power to take those spoils).
Unfortunately, governments have little incentive to negotiate with weaker factions
because these factions have little ability to constrain their stronger rivals. Even if a
state is willing to transfer to one faction resources sufficient to allow that faction to
constrain its rival, a weaker faction would require a much larger transfer and would
therefore be a less desirable negotiating partner due to the cost of transferring power
(Best and Bapat 2012). States will therefore prefer negotiating with stronger factions
when they can.
It is the existence of ideological or other differences between the factions that
allows the government to divide them and split their strength, playing on fears of
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intra-group fighting to achieve a deal with one faction at a lower cost than the en-
tire opposition could be satisfied. As the factions become closer ideologically and
politically, they are better able to overcome commitment problems and less likely to
succumb to state offers that aim to turn them against each other. Where differences
between factions are small, faction leaders and members are likely to have fewer ob-
jections to the policies that a rival faction will implement. Therefore, as the factions
become more similar in their preferences, it becomes more difficult to persuade either
faction that it will do better for itself by disarming the remaining faction and trusting
the state to transfer the promised concessions. Further, as the opposition movement
becomes stronger vis-a-vis the government, we can expect that achieving a credible
deal with an opposition faction will become more difficult for the government. This
is because, when the opposition is strong, the stronger faction - that is the faction
with which the government prefers to negotiate - will only accept very high conces-
sions because it expects to do quite well in the conflict, and the weaker faction in
such a situation is even less likely to be able to constrain its rival at a cost that the
government is willing to pay.
Consider the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Fatah and its like-minded allies
within the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) have been the dominant forces
within Palestine since the late 1960s. Until the early 1990s, Israel and the PLO were
not able to reach any sort of agreement. In the 1980s, as Israel increased the number
of its settlements in Palestine, the rate of administrative detentions (imprisonment
without legal recourse) of Palestinians, and the scale of its retaliations against any
Palestinian violence or protests, the PLO began to lose some of its influence. The
outbreak of the First Intifada in late 1987 initially spurred a revival of the PLO’s
dominance. But, as hope of a Palestinian state through diplomatic means began to
diminish, some Palestinians turned to newer groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas
as an alternative to the PLO which had so far failed to produce an independent or
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autonomous Palestinian state. These groups demanded a Muslim Palestinian state
to replace Israel. The momentum of Hamas was as evident as the PLO’s failure to
stop Israeli settlements or to gain concessions. If Yasir Arafat wanted to maintain
his position in Palestinian politics, he needed to produce results quickly, otherwise he
risked seeing the secular and nationalist PLO marginalized in the face of a growing
religious Palestinian movement. By the time the Oslo talks began, Arafat was still in
a strong position relative to Fatah, but he had lost funding from Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, he had lost face for agreeing to Israeli preconditions for the Madrid talks,6
and he was prepared to moderate the PLO’s stance on certain issues if that would
mean gaining the support he needed to constrain the rise of Hamas.
Fortunately for Arafat, the emergence of his domestic rivals was just what the
Israeli state needed as incentive to negotiate with him. Israel recognized that the
wide discrepancy in the goals that Fatah and Hamas held for any eventual Palestinian
state produced just the sort of animosity between the Palestinian groups that would
allow Israel to trust one to fight the other. Once Israel had decided to negotiate,
choosing a negotiating partner was simple. Fatah was still stronger than Hamas, it
had international name recognition, a long organizational history to lend it stability,
and, significantly, it had the threat of a rival that might eventually overpower it and
replace Fatah’s secular nationalist agenda with a religious one of its own. It was this
threat of losing out to a rival that did not share its goals that led Fatah to compromise,
recognizing Israel’s right to exist and accepting much less than the independence or
full autonomy it had previously demanded. The threat that Hamas presented to
Fatah and Hamas’ inability to credibly commit not to use any future advantage it
might have to further its own agenda at the expense of Fatah’s, allowed Israel to
gain Fatah’s cooperation in fighting Hamas at a lower cost than it could previously
6Israel had refused to allow official PLO recognition at Madrid. Instead, Palestinian moderate
intellectuals attended in a non-official capacity as part of the delegation from Jordan.
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have paid to simply end its own conflict with the PLO.7 When the member groups
of the PLO dominated Palestinian politics, there was not a sufficiently large division
in the preferences of the factions to allow Israel to conclude a deal with any one
faction or subset of the factions. When rivals with significant ideological differences
emerged, deals with concessions that did not match the full strength of the Palestinian
opposition became a real possibility.
The following chapter presents a formal model designed to shed light on the sources
of both failure and success in negotiations and to capture the effect of varying the
intensity of the commitment problem that results between insurgent factions when
one faction is in a position to gain resources from the state that could alter the power
balance between the factions. It is times when this commitment problem is severe, i.e.
the common interest or shared preferences between the factions is low, that produces
the appearance of “extreme” preferences or preferences for violence. Ex ante, promises
of resource transfers to be made from one faction to another after disarmament of the
proposed recipient cannot be made credible since, having disarmed the rival faction,
a faction will prefer not to share its own resources. I assume that at the outset of
the interaction modeled here the insurgency has some probability of disarming the
state; the state has the complementary probability of disarming the insurgency. I
further assume that opposition factions share a common preference (defeating the
state, gaining autonomy), but that they each have a preference on a second issue as
well.8 Further, the balance of power between the factions is captured by a variable
representing the probability with which faction one faction disarms the other. The
model suggests that as the degree of common interest between the factions increases,
7Of course, this same commitment problem also prevented Fatah from persuading Hamas to
accept the Oslo Agreement.
8As will be explained in chapter 3, this second issue preference is captured by a variable ranging
from 0 to 1, which represents the degree of net common interest or policy similarity between the
factions. Therefore, while I refer to this as a second issue for simplicity, the variable could be said
to capture overall net distance between all relevant issues on which the factions hold preferences.
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it may be harder for the government to reach agreements with either faction, but
when they are able to reach agreements, the resulting peace will be more stable than
when factions are divided. This stability is because the factions are better equipped
to overcome the internal commitment problem when they have a greater degree of
common interest.
30
Chapter 3
A Formal Model of the Prospects for Peace with Internally Divided
Separatists
In the previous chapter, I outlined a theory that explains why violence often increases
in response to attempts at negotiating or implementing peace settlements. The expla-
nation is that these settlements create winners and losers, and the would-be “losers” of
the peace often turn to violence to disrupt the peace process, not because they would
not prefer peace to continued war, but because the peace that is offered does not
protect their interests and/or threatens to leave them worse off than would continued
war.
In this chapter I use a formal model to evaluate the effect that changing the in-
tensity of interest divergence between insurgent factions has on the prospects for a
peaceful settlement of civil conflict at various levels of overall opposition strength
and factional power. This model is limited in its application to insurgencies in which
two or more factions are fighting to gain control of a particular resource from a gov-
ernment. We can think of this resource as territory that both factions inhabit, but
which is controlled by the government - as the Israeli government controls the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. While all factions prefer that the insurgency gain control of
the territory from the government, the interests of the factions may not be perfectly
aligned.1 Therefore, while a faction will prefer that its rival faction control the con-
tested territory than for the government to maintain control, that faction will gain
even greater utility from controlling the contested territory itself.
The model suggests that states will be best able to produce broad peace agree-
ments when they negotiate with the stronger of two factions rather than the weaker.
This is because a broad peace requires that both factions acquiesce. If we assume that
the faction directly receiving concessions gains the most utility from those concessions
and that factions that are stronger have a higher utility for fighting than do those
that are weaker, we can see that it is more efficient for a state to negotiate directly
with the stronger faction, i.e. the faction with the more attractive outside option.
The model I develop represents a government targeted by a factionalized insur-
gency seeking to wrest control of some contested territory from the government. The
game allows the government to make some endogenously determined offer of conces-
sions to one of the factions in an attempt to resolve or mitigate the conflict. In the
first section I introduce the model’s actors and describe the basic assumptions of the
game regarding factional competition and the actors’ utility functions. The second
section gives the basic structure of the game including the sequence of moves, the
payoffs, and the assumptions regarding information and beliefs. In the third section
I present the solution to the game, and in the fourth I discuss the implications of the
model.
3.1 Assumptions and Actors
In this section, I elaborate the assumptions regarding the nature of the factional
actors, their origins as distinct factions and the properties that distinguish them,
the willingness of factions to fight the government, and the credibility of government
offers that underpin the model. In doing so, I will define the actors as well as their
1Where factional interests are perfectly aligned, this is equivalent to a unified group. The model
presented here can be applied to unified groups by setting the level of common interest to one.
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utility functions.
3.1.1 The Origins and Preferences of Factions
This project does not make any implicit assumptions regarding the reason for a fac-
tional divide. However, breaking with previous work on negotiations with a factional-
ized opposition, this model explicitly captures the degree of common interest between
factions and its effect. I also assume that factions cannot have greater common in-
terest with the government than they have with each other as component groups of a
common movement. If factions did have more in common with the government than
with each other, they should find it difficult to unite to oppose the government. This
means that a faction will prefer its rival faction to control the contested territory
than for the government to control the territory. To clarify this assumption and its
implementation in the model, I will now introduce the games’ three actors and their
respective utility functions.
For simplicity, I model this interaction with two insurgent factions, A and B, and
a target government, G. All players’ utility functions are represented by the share
of the contested resources X = 1 in that player’s control. I normalize all actors’
utility for the status quo to 0 and assume that at the outset of the interaction the
government controls all of the contested territory. I denote the share of X controlled
by i ∈ A,B at the end of the interaction by xi, therefore, the government’s payoff
at the game’s end is −xA − xB while the factions’ payoffs can be represented as the
share, xi, of X controlled by faction i plus the share xj of X controlled by faction
j 6= i weighted by the value that each faction has for the other’s control of territory,
which we can call δ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, we can define A’s utility function as xA + δxB
and B’s utility function as xB + δxA.
If the government makes an offer to concede some share of X, call this share x ∈
[0, 1], to one of the factions, we can say that the government’s utility for making and
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honoring such an offer is −x. Factions are functionally identical and are distinguished
from each other in the game only by their relative power, or probability of disarming
each other (although factional interests are captured, they are only captured in terms
of the value that the factions’ each have for the other’s control over the contested
territory. I have used a single variable common to both factions to capture this
value.). Thus, the game is symmetrical regardless of which faction the government
chooses to negotiate with. For simplicity, I choose to assume that the government
negotiates with faction A. Therefore, A’s utility for concessions is defined as x while
B’s utility for concessions made to A is δx. Since the government controls the entire
contested territory in the status quo and the factions’ utility for government control
of the territory X is 0, we can say that the common interest between the factions and
the government, that is the utility that the factions receive for the contested territory
under the government’s control, is normalized to 0. So, if δ = 0 then each factions’
value for territory under the control of the other is equal to that faction’s value for
territory under the control of the government. On the other hand, if δ = 1, then the
factions are perfectly united in their interests and each faction gains the same utility
from the other faction’s gains as from its own gains (presumably, in this case the
group is factionalized only for strategic or operational purposes).
3.1.2 Nature of Insurgencies Modeled
This model is intended to capture a crisis between a state and a particular type of non-
state actor. Specifically, this model’s application is limited to violent non-state actors
that are divided into at least two factions seeking to wrest control of a common [zero-
sum] resource from the government. For the purposes of this discussion, I assume
that this resource is territory. Furthermore, this model assumes that at least two
of the non-state actor’s constituent factions are willing to use violence to challenge
the government in the absence of government concessions to some component of the
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opposition. The reasons for this are as follows. First, if there is only one faction
that would be willing to fight in the absence of concessions, then there is effectively
only one, unitary, violent opposition. The state could make concessions to a related
non-violent faction, but this should only affect the probability or severity of a violent
challenge if those concessions also satisfy the violent faction. Second, if there is no
faction that considers the marginal benefit added by its own participation in a conflict
to be worth the costs of participation, then there is no violent challenger to the state
and the dispute will only take a political form. This assumption is formalized in
section 3.2.2 on the model’s payoffs.
3.1.3 The Credibility of Government Offers
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous work has addressed the effects of a commitment
problem between a target government and an insurgency. In particular, Bueno de
Mesquita writes, “once the moderates accept a deal, the continued existence of the
extremists helps to ensure the credibility of government concessions” (2005, 164).
Kydd and Walter’s (2002; 2006) explanation of spoiler violence hinges on the inability
of a moderate terrorist faction to commit to carrying out its end of any negotiated deal
because the state is unable to perfectly observe when the moderates are defecting.
Walter (2002) suggests that commitment problems often stand in the way of successful
implementation of civil war resolutions unless there are third parties willing and able
to observe and enforce compliance.
For the purposes of this model, I assume that government offers of concessions
are credible if they produce a general peace. That is, if a government cuts a deal
with an opposition faction to offer concessions in return for peace, the government
will follow through on its end of the bargain if a general peace ensues - that is, if no
excluded faction continues fighting. On the other hand, if a faction excluded from
the negotiations continues the conflict, the government may choose to renege on its
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offer of concessions. Furthermore, the model assumes that a faction that accepts a
government offer must integrate its own forces with those of the government such that
the faction is no longer able to fight without government assistance and is thereby
made credible in its commitment to discontinue anti-government violence (but also
made vulnerable to government defections in the event that rival factions do not
follow suit). Finally, I do not explicitly model the decision of one opposition faction
to withhold from or grant a share of government concessions to a rival faction.2
Instead, I assume that when factions share many of the same interests and preferences,
the policies that one faction will implement will further not only that faction’s own
agenda, but to a degree determined by the level of common interest between the
factions, will also further the agenda of the other. As this is merely an effect of
having common preferences and requires only that the faction receiving concessions
implements the policies it prefers (or distributes the concessions in the way it desires),
it is always credible.
3.2 Model Structure
The model I present here considers a government with control over contested resource
X facing an armed challenge from a non-state actor that is assumed to be comprised
of two factions, both of which want control over the contested resource X. The state
may chose whether to make an offer of concessions to one faction in order to bring
about peace or to improve its own chances in conflict with the remaining faction.
In turn, factions can choose to accept a state offer (or acquiesce to a deal between
the state and a rival faction) or continue fighting. The outcome of the interaction is
determined by the choices that these three actors take. The primary contribution of
this model is that I allow the strength of the insurgency relative to the government,
2As mentioned previously, Best and Bapat (2012) find that such offers are not credible as carrying
them out would lower the payoff of the offering faction and, having already disarmed, a would-be
recipient factions would not be able to force the transfer.
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as well as strength of the factions relative to each other, to vary, while also varying
the shared interest of the factions. In this section, I formalize the structure of the
game.
3.2.1 Sequence of Moves
The game begins with the government’s choice of one of the two factions to which
it will make an offer of concessions x and its decision regarding the size of offer x.
Play proceeds in the same fashion regardless of which faction the government chooses
to negotiate with. Therefore, the game tree in Figure 3.1 depicts only the branch
of the game tree in which the government chooses to negotiate with A. Once the
offer is made, play proceeds to the recipient of the offer, let us assume this is faction
A, and this faction determines whether to accept or reject the offer. If A rejects
the government’s offer, the game terminates and conflict resumes with both factions
fighting the government just as they were before G’s offer of concessions. If, on
receiving an offer from G, A accepts that offer, A combines its resources with those
of G in such a way that it cannot fight without G’s support, but if it does fight B
with G’s backing, A’s capabilities relative to those of B are increased. If A accepts
the government’s offer, play continues to the faction excluded from negotiations, in
this case B. B has the option of acquiescing to the peace deal negotiated by the
government and A or opposing the deal by continuing to fight. If B accepts the peace
deal, the game ends with the government transferring to A the promised concessions.
In this event, B must disarm, thereby precluding any potential for continuing the
conflict in the future or forcing a renegotiation of the terms of peace. If, on the other
hand, B opposes the deal, play continues to the government which can determine
whether or not to fulfill its part of the deal with A in light of B’s continued use of
violence. The government may either adhere to its deal with A, allowing her to fight
B and maintain control of the territory x ceded by the government, or renege on
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the agreement to cede territory and fight B itself. If the government chooses not to
honor the deal with A once A has relinquished her ability to fight independently, the
government may be able to defeat B and keep all of the contested territory for itself.
If the government does not fulfill its deal, the government fights B alone (without
assistance from A, but also without having to fight A as well as B) and leaves A
without the concessions x and disarmed (since A has combined its forces with those
of the government such that A cannot fight with the government’s consent). If the
government does fulfill, then the government supports A in containing B’s violence.
Figure 3.1: The Game Tree.
If B acquiesces to the deal, then the game terminates with a stable peace agree-
ment wherein B gains its utility for the territory under A’s control. Rather than
terminating the game at this point, it would be possible to give A the option of
transferring some share of her resources into B’s control. However, as Best and Ba-
pat (2012) note, in equilibrium, A would never choose to transfer any resources to
B because doing so would lower A’s own payoff. While A might prefer to be able
to convince B to acquiesce by offering B a share of resources, absent a mechanism
by which to credibly commit to such a transfer in exchange for B’s acquiescence, A
would not be willing ex post to carry out the transfer. Knowing this, B would never
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be swayed by an offer of a share of the concessions. The included faction cannot cred-
ibly commit not to exploit the excluded faction in the event that peace is achieved
and the excluded faction disarms. The lack of a credible commitment from A gives B
greater incentives to fight when it might otherwise be persuaded to disarm. If B were
to disarm, it knows that, regardless of any promises made before the disarmament,
that A’s equilibrium response would be to renege and take all of B’s resources once B
is unable to defend itself. Once a faction disarms, it relinquishes the hope of defeating
the government or forcing concessions for itself in the future. The faction also loses
the ability to defend itself and its own resources from the government or the rival
faction. The commitment problem, and the insecurity it produces in B, thus cause B
to appear to have preferences that are more extreme than B’s true preferences may
be. B may however be inclined to acquiesce if it believes that its value for territory
under the control of A will be sufficiently great that B’s payoff for acquiescing is not
too low.
3.2.2 Payoffs
The model structure suggests four possible outcomes which we can call war (A rejects
the government’s offer of concessions), acquiescence (A accepts the government’s offer
and B acquiesces to the deal), reneging (A accepts the government’s offer, but B
does not acquiesce and the government decides not to fulfill its part of the deal),
and fulfillment (A accepts the government’s offer, B does not acquiesce, and the
government does fulfill its deal with A). The war outcome represents a situation in
which the government, having failed to achieve a deal of any sort, finds itself fighting
both opposition factions. Let w ∈ [0, 1] represent the probability with which factions
A and B together are able to defeat G in the event of war (alternatively, we could
conceive of w as the share of resources X that A and B can win from the government
in the event of war). Next let γ ∈ [0, 1] represent the probability with which A could
39
disarm B were the factions to fight each other (in other words, γ defines the internal
balance of power in the opposition). Since there are only two factions in this model,
B’s probability of defeating A in the event of a fight is 1 − γ. Next assume that
when the factions fight G together they divide their expected spoils w between them
in accordance with the balance of power. Finally, all actors pay expected costs ci for
conflict.
As mentioned previously, I am assuming that in the absence of government con-
cessions, both violent factions will prefer to fight the government (or at least be indif-
ferent between fighting and not fighting). Specifically this assumption requires that
the costs to the respective factions of fighting must be no greater than the marginal
benefits to that faction of its own participation in the conflict (note that this is a
more stringent requirement than that the costs be no greater than the faction’s total
utility for conflict). We can formalize this as the requirements that cA > wγ and
cB > w(1 − γ), or that the payoffs, as shown in Table 3.1, to A and B of war be
non-negative.
When the acquiescence outcome is reached, none of the actors pay any costs
for fighting, and payoffs are determined by the size of the offer x such that the
government pays x and A receives x. However, when faction B does not acquiesce, if
the government decides to fulfill its deal with A, then all factions again pay the costs
of war. But, in this case, B must fight the government and A, rather than fighting
the government alongside A. Since A is no longer fighting as part of the opposition,
the opposition can no longer expect to take spoils equal to w. Instead, B can expect
to gain only w(1 − γ) since it will no longer have A’s fighting power. Notice that
since B does not have to divide any spoils with A, this is the same share of X that B
attains from fighting with A, however, the expected utilities are different because B
has some utility for territory controlled by A. A at this outcome is fighting for control
over only the concessions x ≤ X that G has granted it, but A is fighting alongside G,
40
so A’s probability of defeating B increases from γ to 1 − w(1 − γ) which represents
the complement of B’s probability of defeating both A and G. To see that this does
increase the probability with which A can disarm B, recall that γ ∈ [0, 1], therefore
1−w−wγ > γ because if we move the wγ term from the left to the right side of the
equation and then divide both sides by 1−w, we can reduce the inequality to 1 > γ.
Finally, if the government abdicates its deal with A, A receives no concessions and
is disarmed, thereby preventing her from fighting B or G. The government can then
fight only B and, if successful, keep all of the contested resources X for itself. But,
when the government reneges on a deal, it pays a cost α ∈ [0, 1] for doing so. Table
3.1 presents the model’s outcomes along with the associated payoffs and expected
utilities to each actor. Note that the government’s utilities are always equal to its
payoffs, but for factions A and B the utility of an outcome is dependent both on the
respective actor’s own payoff and on the payoff of its rival.
Table 3.1: Outcomes, Shares of X, and Expected Utility by Actor
Outcome i Share of X EUi
A w(γ) w(γ + δ(1− γ))− cA
War B w(1− γ) w(1− γ + δγ)− cB
G −w −w − cG
A x x
Acq. B 0 δx
G −x −x
A 0 wδ(1− γ)
Ren. B w(1− γ) w(1− γ)− cB
G −w(1− γ) −w(1− γ)− α− cG
A x(1− w(1− γ)) x(1− w(1− γ)) + wδ(1− γ)− cA
Fulfill. B w(1− γ) w(1− γ) + δx(1− w(1− γ))− cB
G −x(1− w(1− γ))− w(1− γ) −x(1− w(1− γ))− w(1− γ)− cG
3.2.3 Information
The game is solved below in complete and perfect information. Perhaps the most
significant aspect of this modeling decision is that it assumes that all actors know the
costs that the government will pay for reneging on a deal, which in turn means that
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the factions know if the government is making a non-credible offer. As we will see,
though this does eliminate equilibria in which the government reneges,3 it does not
prevent the faction included in negotiations from accepting some non-credible offers
(and thus, does not prevent the government from making some non-credible offers).
In what follows, I will present the structure of the game in greater detail as
well as its solution in complete and perfect information using the Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium solution concept (SGPE). I will then discuss the implications of the
theory.
3.3 Solution
The game in complete and perfect information is solved using the Subgame Perfect
refinement of the Nash Equilibrium solution concept (SGPE) which requires ratio-
nal play in every subgame, thereby eliminating equilibria that rely on non-credible
threats. Because play at every subgame is restricted to the Nash Equilbrium of that
subgame, we can use backward induction to find the SGPE. To do this, we begin
analyzing the game by finding the Nash of each subgame that represents an end to
the game.
The final possible decision in the game is that of the government to fulfill or
abdicate its agreement with the included faction given that B is continuing to fight.
At this final subgame, the government will fulfill the terms of its agreement with A
iff α > x(1 − w + γw). Rearranging the terms, we see that G will only fulfill its
agreement with A if the offer fulfills the condition:
x <
α
1− w + γw. (3.1)
Moving up the game tree shown in Figure 3.1, at the next node B must determine
whether to use violence or acquiesce given that the government has struck a deal
3As addressed later, this is contingent on the assumption that cA < wγ.
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with A. B’s decision will be conditioned on whether the government will renege in
the event of violence. If the government will fulfill the terms of its agreement with
A even in the face of violence from B, then B will acquiesce to the agreement if
A has gained concessions from the state that are sufficiently sizable that B cannot
expect to do better by fighting than what it can expect to receive under A’s rule,
then B will accept A’s control of the ceded territory. Therefore, B will accept the
agreement in this case if x > w(1−γ)−cB
δw(1−γ) . If the government will respond to violence
from B by retracting its agreement with A, then B will prefer to acquiesce to A’s
peace agreement with the government iff x > w(1−γ)−cB
δ
.
Table 3.2: Four Cases in Which A Evaluates an Offer x and Associated Outcomes:
Government actions are shown in the top row, B actions in the left column.4
˜REN REN
ACQ x ∈ [w(1−γ)−cB
δw(1−γ) ,
α
1−w+wγ ] x > max[
w(1−γ)−cB
δ
, α
1−w+wγ ]
(1)Acquiesce (2)Acquiesce
˜ACQ x < min[w(1−γ)−cB
δw(1−γ) ,
α
1−w+wγ ] x ∈ [ α1−w+wγ , w(1−γ)−cBδ ]
(3)Fulfill (4)Renege
The next node to consider is the one at which A decides whether to accept an
offer x from the government. Here there are four cases to consider, these cases are
shown in Table 3.2 along with the conditions under which they occur. In cases (1) and
(2) B will acquiesce (though in case (1) the government would renege given violence
from B and in case (2) it would not). As shown in the table, if A accepts the offer
x in either of these cases, the Acquiescence outcome will occur. However, A may
also choose to reject any offer, yielding the War outcome. Comparing A’s utilities for
these outcomes indicates that in both cases (1) and (2) A will accept offers such that
x > w(γ+δ(1−γ))− cA. In the third case, B does not acquiesce and the government
fulfills its deal with A. Therefore, if A accepts the government’s offer the Fulfillment
outcomes obtains, and if A rejects the government’s offer the War outcome obtains.
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Following Table 3.1, A will accept the offer iff x > wγ
1−w+wγ . In the final case, B
does not acquiesce and the government reneges on its deal with A. If A accepts the
offer, it will receive its utility for the Renege outcome and if A rejects the offer War
results. Therefore, A will accept the offer iff 0 > wγ − cA. Since this is never true
by assumption (see 3.2.2 above; for this to be true, A would need to be unwilling to
fight regardless of the size of x), we can say that A will never accept offers that will
result in the Renege outcome.
Of the eight possible equilibria above, four produce the outcome War which yields
UG = −w − cG, two produce the outcome Acquiesce which yields UG = −x, one
produces the outcome Fullfill which yields UG = −x(1− w(1− γ))− w(1− γ)− cG,
and one would produce the outcome Renege but is never possible. Because we know
that when B will not acquiesce to the deal, A will only accept a government offer
when that offer is at least wγ
1−w+wγ , we can substitute that value of x into the equation
for UG(FUL), which yields (
−wγ
1−w+wγ )(1 − w(1 − γ)) − w(1 − γ) − cG, which can be
simplified to UG(FUL) = −w− cG. This means that the government’s utility for the
Renege outcome is the same as its utility for the War outcome.
As established previously, A will accept government offers that will result in B
acquiescing if those offers are at least as great as A’s payoff for war: x ≥ w(γ +
δ(1− γ))− cA. This means that for Acquiesce to be a possible outcome in either case
(1) or (2), it must be that an offer of x ≥ w(γ + δ(1 − γ)) − cA will not violate the
restrictions defining the cases (shown in Table 3.2). For case (1) to exist, it must be
possible that there is some level of concessions at which B would acquiesce and G
would not renege on if B did not acquiesce. This level exists when Equation (3.2) is
true:
δ >
(1− w + wγ)(w(1− γ)− cB
αw(1− γ) . (3.2)
For there to be an offer that A will accept given that B would acquiesce and that
the government would fulfill of B did not acquiesce, it must be true that α
1−w+wγ >
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w(γ + δ(1− γ))− cA. Rewriting this in terms of δ yields Equation (3.3):
δ >
w(cA + γ(1− w + wγ − cA))− α− cA
w(γ − 1 + w(1 + γ(γ − 2))) . (3.3)
If both (3.2) and (3.3) hold, then it is possible for the government to make an
offer that will produce the Acquiesce outcome in case 1. If such an offer is possible,
its value will need to be great enough that both A and B accept (acquiesce to) it.
Because the government’s utility for the Acquiesce outcome is decreasing in the size of
x, G will set x equal to the lowest value that will produce Acquiescence.5 Therefore,
the offer that G will make if it prefers to induce the Acquiesce outcome in case (1) is
x = max[w(γ+δ(1−γ))−cA, w(1−γ)−cBδw(1−γ) ]. Rearranging the terms of these two equations
shows that when Equation (3.4) is true, the former is greater than the latter and is
by extension the minimum offer that will produce the Acquiesce outcome:
δ >
(
wγ − cA
2w(γ − 1)
)
+
(
1
2
)√
c2A − 4(cB − w + wγ)− 2cAγw + w2γ2
w2(γ − 1)2 . (3.4)
When (3.4) is false, w(1−γ)−cB
δw(1−γ) is the minimum offer that will produce the Acquiesce
outcome in case (1).
Of course, for either of the possible offers listed above to be made, the government
must prefer the payoff−x to that of war. When (3.4) holds, this means that−w−cG <
−w(γ + δ(1 − γ)) + cA must be true, which is always the case because all of the
component variables are constrained to be between zero and one. When (3.4) is false,
the government will prefer offering x = w(1−γ)−cB
δw(1−γ) to war when (3.5) is true:
δ >
1
w + cG
− cB
w(1− γ)(w + cG) . (3.5)
When Equation (3.2) holds true, but (3.3) does not, then the Acquiesce outcome
5If the negative of that offer is no less than than −w − cG, G’s utility for war.
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is not possible in case 1 because, while the government can make a credible offer that
would induce B to renege, it cannot make a credible offer that will induce A to accept
the offer, even given that B will acquiesce. When this is so, the government will set
x such that w(1−γ)−cB
δw(1−γ) < x <
α
1−w+wγ and A will reject the offer, resulting in war.
6
For case (2) to occur, it must be true that there is a non-credible offer that will
induce B to acquiesce, call this condition (3.6):
δ > w(1− γ)− cB. (3.6)
Because −1 < −w − cG < w(γ + δ(1 − γ)) + cA, if B will acquiesce, there is always
some level of concessions G could offer to A that it would not fulfill in the event of
violence from B. This leaves only the questions of what the minimum offer to induce
A to accept and B to acquiesce is and whether G prefers paying that cost to paying
the cost of war. If A’s utility for war (or outside option) is greater than both α
1−w+wγ
and w(1−γ)−cB
δ
, then the lowest offer the government can make to induce the Acquiesce
outcome is x = w(γ + δ(1 − γ)) − cA. When (3.3) is false while (3.7) is true, these
conditions are met.
δ >
(
wγ − cA
2w(γ − 1)
)
+
(
1
2
)√
c2A + 4w(w − cB − 12cAγ + cBγ − 2wγ) + 5w2γ2
w2(γ − 1)2 (3.7)
Since w(γ + δ(1− γ))− cA < w+ cG, when this value of x will produce Acquiesce, G
will make the offer.
If instead (3.6) is true while (3.7) is false and (3.8) is true, then it is the case that
the minimum non-credible offer to which B will acquiesce is greater than A’s payoff
6To remain in case (1), the government’s offer must be in this range. I also show in what follows
that, given (3.2) is true when (3.3) is not, that making the offer described is a best response.
46
for war (outside option).
δ <
(1− w + wγ)(w(1− γ)− cB)
α
. (3.8)
If this is all true, then the government will offer x = w(1−γ)−cB
δ
if this value is less
than w + cG, or, in terms of δ if (3.9) is true:
δ >
w(1− γ)− cB
w + cG
. (3.9)
If, however, (3.9) is false, then G cannot achieve an Acquiesce outcome in this case
at a cost it prefers to war. Therefore, G’s best response under the conditions will be
to set x < w(γ + δ(1− γ))− cA. A will reject such an offer and war will ensue.
If the conditions for none of the four paths to an Acquiesce outcome are met,
then one of the paths leading to a War outcome will be possible in equilibrium.
This is because it is always possible for the government to set x such that the War
outcome results in which A rejects a credible government offer that would result in
the Fulfillment outcome if it were accepted.7 Although the Fulfillment outcome may
be possible in equilibrium, we can assume that it does not occur since it has the
same utility for the government as War. Therefore, in equilibrium, there are two
possible outcomes to the game presented here: War and Acquiesce. Because I have
included in the conditions for each path to the Acquiesce outcome the condition that
the government must prefer that path and its outcome to War, we can conclude that
if the conditions for any of the path to the Acquiesce outcome are satisfied, the game
will result in this outcome. However, the different paths by which this outcome may
be reached produce different utilities for the government. This means that when
more than one path is possible, we must determine which of the available paths to
7The criteria under which this is possible, α > 0, wγ > 0, and w(1− γ)− cB > 0 are all true by
assumptions established previously.
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acquiescence the government will choose.
Table 3.3 lists the conditions for each path to the Acquiesce outcome. Comparing
the conditions for each path indicates that the only paths that could possibly be
concurrently available are paths 1 and 4 and paths 2 and 4. However, evaluating
(3.2) and (3.8), we can see that these conditions are mutually exclusive because
α > αw(1− γ). Therefore, none of the paths to the outcome Acquiesce are mutually
possible in equilibrium. We can conclude then that when the conditions outlined in
Table 3.3 are satisfied for any one path to an Acquiesce outcome, in equilibrium, the
government will set x to the best response indicated in the table for that outcome.
When none of the pathways to an Acquiesce outcome are available, then war will
occur. Since the government has the same utility for the War outcome regardless of
the path by which it is reached and war always results if x = 0, then we can assume
that, when Acquiesce is not an equilibrium, the government will set x = 0 and A will
reject the offer resulting in war.
Table 3.3: Conditions For Acquiesce Outcomes: Equations that must hold true(T)
or false(F) for each path to acquiescence to be possible.
Path: value of x (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7) (3.8) (3.9)
1: w(γ + δ(1 − γ)) − cA
(Fulfill)
T T T
2: w(1−γ)+cB
δw(1−γ) (Fulfill) T T F T
3: w(γ + δ(1 − γ)) − cA
(Renege)
F T T
4: w(1−γ)+cB
δ
(Renege) T F T T
To understand when an agreement that will end violence from both factions is
possible, let us consider the criteria that must be met for each outcome to be possi-
ble. Figure 3.2 graphs each of these criteria (as defined in Equations (3.2) through
(3.9)). In the figure, only Paths 1 and 3 to the Acquiesce outcome are open at some
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point (in the ranges where neither of these paths is available War will occur in equilib-
rium). In each range where Acquiesce is the equilibrium outcome, I have indicated in
parentheses through which path it occurs. For example, given that we are in a world
where the parameters γ, α, and the respective costs of conflict are the same as those
in Figure 3.2, when γ is moderately high and w is close to .5 (i.e. the area identified
as ACQ(1)), then in equilibrium G will offer x = w(γ + δ(1− γ))− cA (which it will
be willing to fulfill in the event that B does not acquiesce), A will accept the offer,
and B will acquiesce.
Figure 3.2: Criteria for Four Paths to Acquiescence: (3.2) is graphed on the thick
grey line, (3.3) is graphed on the dot-dash line, (3.4) is graphed on the thick dot-dash
line, (3.5) is on the dotted line, (3.6) is on the solid line, (3.7) is on the thick dashed
line, (3.8) is on the thick solid line, and (3.9) is on the dashed line. All functions are
plotted using the values γ = .75, α = .25, ci = .1.
As noted in Table 3.3, the first pathway requires that (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) all be
true. In other words, it requires that an offer to which B will acquiesce and G would
otherwise fulfill exist, that there be such an offer A will be willing to accept, and that
A’s utility for war be greater than the level of x at which B will acquiesce to an offer
that G would fulfill. When the value of δ (the value by which one faction’s utility
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for another’s territorial gains are weighted) at a given value of w (the share of the
contested territory that the united insurgency can expect take from the government
in the event of war) is greater than all three of the graphed functions, the Acquiesce
outcome with x = w(γ + δ(1− γ))− cA is the equilibrium outcome.
The second path to the Acquiesce outcome requires that (3.2), (3.3), and (3.5) are
true while (3.4) is false. Recall that when (3.5) is true, G prefers to pay the minimum
offer that will induce B to acquiesce given that the offer is credible than to fight. The
other conditions are the same as those used to define the circumstances under which
the first path to the Acquiesce outcome is possible. While in Path 1 acquiescence
was possible when δ was greater than each of the three relevant functions, in Path
2 acquiescence is possible when δ is greater than the lines graphed by (3.2), (3.3),
and (3.5) and less than the line graphed by (3.4). If these criteria are met, G’s best
response offer is x = w(1−γ)+cB
δw(1−γ) .
The third path requires that (3.3) be false while (3.6) and (3.7) are true. If (3.6)
is true, then there is an offer that the government would not fulfill in the event that
B did not acquiesce that will induce B to acquiesce. The criteria defined by (3.7)
dictates that the government’s utility for fighting is less than its utility for making
an offer such as the one just described. The minimum such offer (and therefore G’s
best response offer if the conditions listed are met) is x = w(γ + δ(1− γ))− cA.
The fourth path is open when (3.6), (3.8), and (3.9) are true while (3.7) is false.
While (3.6) and (3.9) are familiar from the previous path, (3.8) establishes that an
offer exists that the government would prefer to renege (given the cost of the offer
and the cost, α of reneging) and to which B would not be willing to acquiesce.8 The
final criteria, (3.9), stipulates that the government prefers to pay x = w(1−γ)+cB
δ
to
achieve the Acquiesce outcome than to obtain its utility for war.
8Note when referring to Figure 3.2 that (3.8) is the only equation that is true when δ is less than
the graphed function.
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To see when Acquiescence will occur in equilibrium, I evaluate the comparative
statics of the various functions graphed in Figure 3.2. As cA, A’s cost for fighting,
increases, so too do (3.3), (3.4), and (3.7). As cB increases, (3.2), (3.4), (3.5), (3.7),
(3.9), (3.6), and (3.8) all decrease. As cG increases, (3.5) and (3.9) decrease. Increas-
ing α causes (3.3) to increase while (3.2) and (3.8) decrease. Increasing γ decreases
(3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.7), (3.6), and (3.9). However, increasing γ when cB is sufficiently
high causes (3.2) and (3.8) to decrease at low levels of w, but increase when w is high.
The caveat to this is that when γ is very high, further increases in its value will de-
crease the value of (3.2) and (3.8) at all levels of w. As α decreases, the value of γ
from which further increases in γ will no longer increase the value of (3.2) increases.
Given the effects of component variables on the various functions, we can say
that, as γ increases, the range of values of w and δ at which either Path 1 or Path
3 is available expands. To see this graphically, refer to Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Figure
3.3 is the same as Figure 3.2 in all respects save one - the value of γ is increased
from .75 in Figure 3.2 to γ = .99. This one change shifted the values of all functions
except (3.3) below the x axis, and left only Acquiescence through either Path or Path
3 as possible equilibria. The intuition behind this is that when γ = 1, the factions
are, for the purposes of this model, perfectly united. In other words, an insurgency
in which γ = 1 is essentially undivided - it as if there are no factions. When two
actors engage in crisis negotiations, we know that as long as war is costly and there
are no information problems or commitment problems, there should be a negotiated
settlement that both prefer to war.
When γ approaches 1, changes in the values of the three cost parameters, cA,
cB, and cG, have no effect on the equilibrium. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the effect of
changing the value of α when γ = .99. As α increases, the plot of (3.3) shifts to the
right - which means that the range of values of w at which Path 3 is the equilibrium
outcome is expanding toward w = 1. This is because the critical distinction between
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the conditions for Path 1 and those for Path 3 is (3.3), which is true when a credible
offer that A will accept exists. Since credibility is a function of the costs to the
government of reneging (i.e. α), as α increases, this cutpoint shifts.
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium Outcomes when γ = .99: (3.3) is graphed on the dot-dash
line, all other functions fall below the x axis. All functions are plotted using the
values γ = .99, α = .25, ci = .1.
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium Outcomes when γ = .99 as α increases: (3.3) is graphed on
the dot-dash line, all other functions fall below the x axis. All functions are plotted
using the values γ = .99, α = .75, ci = .1.
The above establishes that at the highest levels of γ, Acquiescence is always pos-
sible when the government best responds by setting x = w(γ + δ(1 − γ)) − cA. At
lower levels of γ, the situation is more complicated. At low levels of γ Paths 1 and
3 are possible at some level of w and δ, but war is also possible in equilibrium. To
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consider the effects of the various component variables on the prospects for each path
to peace, I evaluate the effect on each Path individually as I change one variable’s
value at a time holding the others, including γ constant at .1. Figure 3.5 graphs the
criteria expressed in (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) with all variables held constant at .1;
Figure 3.6 does the same with the criteria (3.3), (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9). Given
the parameters of the graphs, neither Path 1, Path 2, or Path 4 is open; the range at
which Paths 3 occurs is indicated in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.5: Equilibrium Outcomes when γ = α = ci = .1: (3.2) is graphed on the
thick line, (3.3) is graphed on the dashed line, (3.4) is graphed on the dotted line,
and (3.5) is graphed on the thin solid line.
Figure 3.6: Equilibrium Outcomes when γ = α = ci = .1: (3.3) is graphed on the
dashed line, (3.7) is graphed on the thick line, (3.6) is graphed on the dotted line,
(3.9) is graphed on the thin solid line, and (3.8) is graphed on the dot-dash line.
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Taking Figure 3.5 first, increasing cB while holding the remaining variables con-
stant opens a range of values of w for which, at mid to high levels of γ, Path 1 becomes
possible. This effect is captured in Figure 3.7, which varies from Figure 3.5 only in
that the value of cB is increased to .5. Increasing cG alone has no effect on Paths 1
or 2. Increasing cA while the remaining variables are set at .1 has no effect on Path 1
or 2, however since increasing cA causes (3.3) and (3.4) to increase, we can conclude
that it’s only effect at any values of the remaining variables will be to close the ranges
of w and γ at which those Paths would otherwise be possible (especially since (3.3)
increases more quickly than (3.4)). Increasing α causes (3.2) to decrease while (3.3)
increases. Even small increases in α can cause the range for Path 1 to close because
the effect of (3.3) is so strong. This effect is captured in Figure 3.8, which is the
same as the previous figure except that α is increased to .2. Notice that no single
variable change is enough to open Path 2 when γ = .1. This is because the graph of
(3.4) is a line that runs through the two points at which the graphs of (3.2) and (3.3)
intersect. This is the case regardless of the values of the other variables as long as
curves graphed by (3.2) and (3.3) intersect; when the curves no longer intersect (3.3)
rises above (3.4) while (3.2) falls below - meaning that the Path 2 is not possible then
either (to see an example of this, refer to Figures 3.7 and 3.8).
I move next to a discussion of Paths 3 and 4, the criteria for which are graphed
in Figure 3.6. Increasing the value of α expands the range of w values at which Path
3 is open by raising the graph of (3.3) without changing its shape or affecting the
graphs of (3.7) and (3.6). Notice that this means that when α is low, credible deals
are easier to make at extreme values of w than when the government and insurgents
are more evenly matched. This change is graphed in Figure 3.9. Note that increasing
α has no effect on the availability of Path 4 - this is true at all values of α. Increasing
cA contracts the range of values at which Path 3 is open (again having no effect on
the availability of Path 4) by raising both (3.3) and (3.7). This effect is shown in
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Figure 3.7: Equilibrium Outcomes when γ = α = cA = cG.1 and cB = .5: (3.2) is
graphed on the thick line, (3.3) is graphed on the dashed line, (3.4) is graphed on the
dotted line, and (3.5) is graphed on the thin solid line.
Figure 3.8: Equilibrium Outcomes when γ = cA = cG.1, cB = .5, and α = .2: (3.2)
is graphed on the thick line, (3.3) is graphed on the dashed line, (3.4) is graphed on
the dotted line, and (3.5) is graphed on the thin solid line.
Figure 3.10. Increasing cB has the opposite effect of expanding the range of values at
which Path 3 is open by raising both (3.7) and (3.6). This effect, which is particularly
pronounced at lower levels of w is illustrated in Figure 3.11. Again, changing cB has
no effect on the availability of Path 4. It seems that the reason Path 4 is never open is
that (3.7) only falls below (3.6) and (3.9) when all three cross the x intercept together.
3.4 Analysis and Empirical Implications
From the above discussion it seems that the Acquiesce outcome can only be reached
through Paths 1 and 3. We can therefore say that, in equilibrium, if the conditions
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Figure 3.9: Equilibrium Outcomes when γ = ci = .1 and α = .25: (3.3) is graphed
on the dashed line, (3.7) is graphed on the thick line, (3.6) is graphed on the dotted
line, (3.9) is graphed on the thin solid line, and (3.8) is graphed on the dot-dash line.
Figure 3.10: Equilibrium Outcomes when γ = α = cB = cG = .1 and cA = .25: (3.3)
is graphed on the dashed line, (3.7) is graphed on the thick line, (3.6) is graphed on
the dotted line, (3.9) is graphed on the thin solid line, and (3.8) is graphed on the
dot-dash line.
(3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) are satisfied then the government will offer to faction A x =
w(γ+ δ(1−γ))− cA, which A will accept and to which B will acquiesce. In the event
that B did not acquiesce, the government would still fulfill the agreement with A. If
instead condition (3.3) is false and conditions (3.6) and (3.7) are true, the government
will make the same offer x to faction A, A will still accept the offer, and B will still
acquiesce. The difference is in the off equilibrium path play - in the event that B did
not acquiesce, the government would retract its offer to A.
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Figure 3.11: Equilibrium Outcomes when γ = α = cA = cG = .1 and cB = .25: (3.3)
is graphed on the dashed line, (3.7) is graphed on the thick line, (3.6) is graphed on
the dotted line, (3.9) is graphed on the thin solid line, and (3.8) is graphed on the
dot-dash line.
This discussion will focus on Paths 1 and 2 and the conditions under which they
exist. In the previous section I established that as γ increases to 1, the prospects for
an Acquiesce outcome also increase, ultimately to the point that war no longer occurs
in equilibrium. This is because when γ is very high this is equivalent to there being
only one effective faction. If γ captures the strength of A relative to B, then when
γ = 1, B is powerless and can win nothing from fighting. When this is the case, the
insurgency is, for the purposes of this model, united. When the insurgency is united,
then this model is essentially no different from any other crisis bargaining model in
complete and perfect information. Since reneging is not an option (and therefore
commitment problems between the state and the insurgency are a non-issue) in the
model when there is no violence and war is costly, there is always a peaceful resolution
that both sides will prefer to war.
Increasing the value of α increases the range of w values at which Path 3 is possible
while decreasing the range of values at which Path 1 is possible. It does this by raising
the value of (3.3). It makes sense that the variable capturing the government’s costs
of reneging will affect when the Acquiesce outcome will be reached through offers that
the government would be willing to renege on and when through those the government
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would fulfill. However, since α affects only which through which path the outcome is
reached and not the size of the offer (which is the same for both Paths 1 and 3) or
the outcome reached, it’s implications are not testable.
Like α, increasing the costs to the included faction A of fighting also shifts the
graph of (3.3) to the right, but once again, this is not testable. The effect of increasing
the costs to the included faction A of fighting on the range of values of w and δ at
which Paths 1 and 2 can be reached is dependent upon the value of γ. At very high
levels of γ, the only effect of increasing these costs is that of changing when Acquiesce
will be reached through Path 1 and when through Path 2. However, at lower levels
of γ, increasing cA contracts the range of values of w and δ at which either path can
be reached by increasing the values of (3.7) and (3.4) and (3.3). This suggests that,
except when the insurgencies power is heavily concentrated in the hands of the faction
with which the government is negotiating, the less willing the negotiating faction is
to fight, the less likely negotiations are to produce peace.
Increasing the costs to the excluded faction B of fighting expands the ranges of w
and δ at which both Path 1 and Path 3 are possible. This is because as cB increases,
the values of the (3.2), (3.4). eqref5, and (3.6) all decrease ((3.3) is unchanged).
Combining this with the effect of γ, we can conclude that the prospects for a peaceful
resolution to conflict improve as the relative strength of the excluded faction decreases
(i.e. γ increases) and the costs to that faction of fighting increase - or as the utility
of the excluded faction for fighting decreases, the prospects for peace increase.
The effect of γ as elaborated above suggests that governments will do better in
negotiations if they choose to negotiate with the stronger of two factions. Recall that
for Acquiescence to be the equilibrium outcome, the government must gain greater
utility for that outcome than for war (since the government’s utility for Acquiesce is
−x and in both possible paths the equilibrium offer for Acquiesce is x = w(γ + δ(1−
γ))−cA, then this is the same as saying that −w−cG < −w(γ+δ(1−γ))+cA, which
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is always true because, since the variables are all less than 1, w > w(γ + δ(1− γ))).
Therefore, we can conclude that when Acquiesce is possible, the government will
prefer it to War, which always yields UG = −w−cG, which means that the government
will prefer to negotiate with the stronger of the factions. Further, this will be true
even thought the size of the necessary offer x to produce the Acquiesce outcome is
increasing in γ when γ is high (which suggests that, although a peaceful resolution
is always possible when the insurgencies power is concentrated in one faction, peace,
where it is possible, is cheaper when the disparity in power between factions is not
too great). This is because, to arrive at peace, both factions must acquiesce to the
agreement. Since the excluded faction receives a lower value for an agreement made
between the state and the included faction and stronger factions have better outside
options, we can say that an offer that produces peace when made to a weaker faction
will need to be higher than an offer that produces peace made to a stronger faction.
It is counterintuitive that offers that produce peace must be larger when they are
granted to weaker factions, but this is what follows from the above. It is straightfor-
ward to see from the payoffs that the reason offers that produce peace must be larger
when they are made to the weaker actor is, in order to produce peace, the excluded
(stronger) faction must acquiesce, which only happens when the offer is so large that
it satisfies the excluded faction despite any discrepancy in factional preferences. Since
governments prefer to pay lower concessions for peace, they are more likely to make
concessions to a more powerful faction when they make concessions. Recall that con-
cessions will only be made if they are less than w + cG. When an offer made to the
weaker of two factions will produce peace (call such an offer xl) then, assuming that
the stronger faction does not have a higher cost of conflict than the weaker, there
will always be a lower offer the government can make to the stronger faction that
will also produce peace. This is because for peace to result the faction receiving the
offer must accept it and the excluded faction must acquiesce to the agreement. If the
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government is able to make an offer to a weaker faction that will induce the stronger
to acquiesce, then it follows that that government must also be able to make an offer
that the stronger faction would accept. So long as the costs that the excluded faction
would pay for fighting are sufficiently high, then the weaker faction should be will-
ing to acquiesce to some offer less than xl made to the stronger faction because the
discount factor δ on that offer is the same for both factions and the lower capability
of the weaker faction lowers its payoff for resistance. It follows that a government
seeking peace will prefer to deal with the stronger faction (where deals to produce
peace are possible) since peace can be bought with lesser concessions when dealing
with stronger factions - even though stronger factions have a more attractive outside
option due to their better war prospects.
It is unsurprising that the offer that can produce peace is decreasing in the gov-
ernment’s utility for war (recall that the government’s utility for war, −w − cG, is
decreasing in w, the strength of the insurgency, while the offer, x = w(γ+δ(1−γ))−cA,
is increasing in w) - the more the government stands to lose in war, the more it will
be willing to give up to avoid war. The size of the minimum offer that will produce
peace in equilibrium is also increasing in δ. This is because δ can be considered the
benefit that each faction receives for territory controlled by the other faction rather
than by the government. For the included faction, a higher δ means that its utility
for rejecting an offer is greater because in war each faction expects to take control of
some measure of the contested territory and the included faction would benefit from
both its own territory and that of the excluded faction. For the excluded faction
a higher δ means that it gains more from acquiescing to a peace that the included
faction has already accepted than if δ were low. If the government will renege, this
is especially bad for an excluded faction with high δ because it will lose all utility
for the government’s concessions if it does not acquiesce because those concessions
will be retracted. This suggests that when unity is very high, governments will find
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it very costly to conclude deals with a stronger faction. While it might seem that a
government could avoid this problem by dealing with a weaker faction when unity is
high (since weaker factions have a lower utility for conflict and the since the high value
of δ makes the excluded faction more inclined to acquiesce), when unity is high, the
weaker faction’s value for conflict is raised because it receives utility for the territory
the stronger faction is able to gain control of as well. This in turn leads to Hypothesis
1:
Hypothesis 1. When factions have fewer policy divisions, peace agreements are
less likely to be reached, but when they are will more often pro-
duce a broad peace.
Conversely, when unity between the factions is low, an included faction has less to
gain from rejecting the offer and going to war since that faction will not receive much
value for the other faction’s gains, making its total utility for war lower than if unity
were high. Also, when unity is low an excluded faction has less incentive to acquiesce
to the peace because it expects to gain little utility for the territory the state has
transferred to the control of the included faction. Further, if the state will renege
on its agreement if the excluded faction uses violence, this is not as harmful for an
excluded faction that places little value on the included faction’s gains. This suggests
that we may be more likely to see that when factional unity is low, governments
will find it very costly to make an offer great enough to satisfy both factions (since
the excluded faction receives only a very discounted value for the offer). Since this
means that when unity is low excluded factions are less likely to acquiesce to peace
deals, included factions will in turn be more careful about accepting only offers that
appear credible. This is because the included faction will anticipate that the excluded
faction’s violence will continue in response to the peace deal. If the government faces
costs for reneging that are less than the cost of fulfilling the deal, it will renege,
leaving the included faction worse off than it would have been had it not made any
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deal. Therefore, as a corollary to Hypothesis 1, we can add Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2. When there are significant policy differences between opposition
factions, peace agreements are more likely to be agreed to, but
are less likely to bring about peace.
The effect of the power balance between the factions on the size of x′ is also
dependent on the particular set of circumstances in which the government finds itself
(though it is worth recalling here that the cases listed in the previous section are
themselves dependent on the power balance between the factions and on the power
of the faction with which the government has chosen to negotiate relative to the
excluded faction). The minimum offer sufficient to produce peace is increasing in the
outside options of both factions - specifically the minimum offer that will satisfy both
factions must provide utility to each faction that is at least as great as the utility
that faction would receive for its outside option. The outside option of faction A is
increasing in γ while the outside option of faction B is decreasing in γ because γ
represents both the relative power between the factions by capturing A’s ability to
disarm B. When γ is close to .5, the outside options of the factions are reasonably
close as well. This suggests that offers for peace will be lowest (and therefore most
likely to occur as they are more likely to be less costly than conflict) when factions are
roughly even in their power. In all cases, the state’s offer is increasing in the strength
of the stronger faction. However, the effect of a change in γ is much more pronounced
when the excluded faction is stronger (within the constraint that x′ ∈ (0, 1)). This in
turn suggests that the government should prefer to make deals with the stronger of
the factions, because the faction that has the most to gain from continuing to fight
must be acquiesce to the agreement for peace to be reached. The government can
more efficiently satisfy the demands of a stronger faction by dealing directly with that
faction. All of this leads to Hypothesis 3 regarding the effect of the relative power of
factions on the government’s choice of a negotiating partner:
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Hypothesis 3. Agreements that produce peace are more often made between a
target government and the stronger of the factions, rather than
the weaker faction.
When they do not expect to gain much from the transfer of contested territory
from the government to the control of the included faction, excluded factions will be
unwilling to acquiesce to the terms of a peace settlement. Once a faction disarms, it
relinquishes the hope of defeating the government or forcing concessions for itself in
the future. The faction also loses the ability to defend itself and its own resources
from the government or the rival faction. Even where policy goals and values are
somewhat similar, this similarity may not be enough to persuade the excluded faction
to acquiesce.
In the 1993 Oslo Accords, Fatah negotiated concessions from Israel that benefitted
both itself and Hamas. Hamas however opposed the deal and made violent attacks
against both Fatah and Israel in its attempts to spoil the agreement because it did
not expect to benefit as much from Fatah’s control over territory as it would from
continuing to fight and improve its own bargaining position. The Hamas leadership
believed that if it acquiesced, it risked becoming irrelevant relative to the position
that Fatah had cemented for itself. In this case, it seems that Hamas believed it
might be strong enough to gain some territory for itself through resistance of both
Fatah and Israel. Also, as it turns out, Israel was not completely willing to carry out
all parts of the agreement in the face of continuing violence from Hamas and other
smaller groups (though Israel did not completely renege on the agreement either).
When the factions are close to parity with each other, an excluded faction may still
be quite strong, even if it is the weaker of the two factions. Strong excluded factions
(or factions with very low costs for conflict) may appear to be more extreme in their
preferences because they have a high utility for fighting and therefore require greater
concessions to be willing to cooperate with the government. To see an example of how
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apparent extremism increases with factional strength, consider the case of Hamas’ rise
in Palestine. Israel allowed the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic
Congress in Gaza in the 1970s and 1980s because it hoped that the much weaker
Brotherhood would grow to present a religious alternative to the nationalist PLO and
Fatah. As the Muslim Brotherhood grew in strength and popularity, its offshoots,
including Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, embraced violence in their opposition
to Israel. As these groups grew stronger relative to the PLO, Israel engaged the still
strong but declining PLO in negotiations in the early 1990s.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper moves the spoiler violence literature beyond the simplistic assumption
that extreme preferences motivate spoiler violence. Rather than assuming that spoiler
violence is the result of extreme preferences on a single issue and black boxing the
origin of those preferences, I propose a new understanding of spoiler violence that
takes into account the multifaceted nature of opposition factions. Different factions
of a single insurgency may hold common preferences on some issues but different
preferences on others which may lead each faction to expect that it would not do
very well under the rule of its rival faction. This suggests both that states may use
criteria other than factional preferences (or degree of extremism) to choose negotiating
partners and that excluded factions will oppose peace deals when they do not expect
that those deals will protect their own interests. To return to the Palestinian example,
both Fatah and Hamas seek an independent Palestinian state. The groups differ
ideologically in their conception of what that state should look like where Fatah
seeks a secular Palestinian state, Hamas looks for an Islamist state. This divergence
in preferences between the groups prevents Hamas from accepting any peace talks
that favor Fatah. Hamas recognizes that such talks can strengthen and legitimize
Fatah, thereby advancing Fatahs goals for Palestine relative to those of Hamas.
The theory implies that governments seeking a comprehensive peace are more
64
likely to negotiate with the stronger of the factions than with the weaker. Weaker
factions have less to gain from conflict and will therefore accept lower offers, however
these deals will not produce comprehensive peace deals because they will be too small
to interest the more powerful faction.
In the next chapter, I use the comparative case study method to evaluate the
three hypotheses drawn from the theoretical model developed in this chapter.
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Chapter 4
Case Study Evaluation
4.1 Introduction and Motivation
In the previous chapter, I developed a theory of negotiations between a target gov-
ernment and a fragmented opposition movement. In this chapter, I use empirical
evidence in the form of cases to evaluate the implications of the theoretical model
and to determine to what degree the model’s central hypotheses are supported by the
cases at hand. To that end, I choose cases from multiple time points of the conflict
over Palestine to evaluate the effects of the the two causal variables that, in Chapter
3, I propose to affect the successful implementation of peace deals. These variables
are the degree of divisiveness between the insurgent factions and the strength of
the faction with which the state negotiates relative to the strength of the remaining
faction.
In Chapter 3, I propose that the apparent extremism that leads to spoiler violence
in opposition to peace talks or agreements between the state and one faction of the op-
position is actually the result of divergent preferences between the opposition factions
and of the commitment problem that these divergences produce. Although factions
of an insurgency often share a common preference on one issue (say autonomy), they
may have different preferences regarding a second issue (what that autonomy should
look like - what sort of governance, what type of legal code, etc.). I argue that those
who spoil peace do so because the negotiated settlement disadvantages them relative
to the gains they expect to make from continued conflict because the negotiations ne-
glect to address their particular preferences. If the faction receiving concessions could
credibly commit to sharing those concessions with the faction excluded from nego-
tiations once that faction has disarmed, then spoiling could potentially be avoided.
Where this internal commitment problem exists however, it creates incentives for
spoiler violence.
Negotiations with one faction can allow the government to offer concessions to
that faction in exchange for its disengagement from the conflict with the government
and its assistance in constraining the remaining faction. A faction included in ne-
gotiations and receiving concessions from the government may wish to persuade the
excluded faction to disarm by offering it a share of the spoils of negotiation once it
does so, but, if the excluded faction disarms, the included faction would no longer
have any incentive to share resources. A faction receiving concessions from the state
cannot credibly commit to sharing the concessions with the faction excluded from
negotiations once that faction has disarmed.
The model suggests that the appearance of extremist preferences results when the
interests of a powerful or moderately powerful faction are not addressed by a peace
agreement in a way that is commensurate with that faction’s power and the faction
that is included in negotiations cannot credibly commit to protecting the interests
of the excluded faction once it has gained government concessions. In other words,
what often appear to be extremist preferences are actually the results of an internal
commitment problem. Stronger factions have more to gain from any potential rebel
victory (as most of the spoils from such a victory would go to the more powerful
faction), therefore we can anticipate that they will require greater concessions than
weaker factions to dissuade them from fighting. However, the model indicates that
states seeking peace will still prefer to negotiate with the stronger faction, where we
can think of a faction’s strength as as indication of that faction’s expected utility from
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fighting where factions that are stronger can take more resources from the government
and pay a lower cost for fighting. The only way that an excluded faction will trust
that its interests will be protected in the event of a peace agreement is if its interests
are very similar to those of the included faction; as the similarity between the factions
decreases, the size of the offer must increase for the excluded faction to acquiesce.
Where factions have significantly different preferences, there may be no deal that
both factions will accept. This contradicts the typical conception of moderates and
extremists as factions whose preferences differ by degree. In such a case, we could
say moderates will accept less of the desired good, say territory, than will extremists.
Therefore, any offer that satisfies the more “extreme” faction satisfies both. The
commitment problem between factions furnishes the government with an opportunity
to coerce one faction into cooperation and to turn the factions against each other or to
disarm both factions at a lower cost than it otherwise could by playing on the divisions
within the factions - offering to one an appealing concession, thereby leaving the other
in a position of choosing between acquiescing or fighting the government without an
ally.
The excluded faction’s utility for acquiescing is a function of the policy similar-
ity it shares with the included faction. The model assumes complete and perfect
information. This means that, in the world of the model, each actor knows how
the other actors will respond to a given move and that each actor knows that the
other actors know how it will respond and that the previous moves of the game are
commonly known. Therefore, within the game, actors cannot successfully bluff about
their strength, costs of conflict, or intentions. So, when the state makes an offer
that it will not fulfill in the event that spoiler violence occurs, both the included and
excluded factions know this.
The previous chapter’s formal model proposes answers to the questions (1) why
do states continue to try to negotiate peace deals with insurgent factions when such
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attempts are frequently met with an increase violence and (2) if it is irrational to
take an uncompromising approach toward peace deals given that war is ex post facto
inefficient, then why do we observe spoiler violence? The answers I propose are
that spoiler violence occurs when excluded factions believe that their interests are
threatened (or at least, given their power, not addressed adequately) by the peace.
Though these factions are rational actors and, as such, prefer peace to war, they
seek to force a revision of the terms of peace. Secondly, states persist in trying to
negotiate with some factions because the existence of divisions within an opposition
may actually create opportunities either for peace at a lower cost to the state or for
the state to make a deal that will further divide and weaken the opposition.
From the above theory, I derive three hypotheses which were discussed further in
the previous chapter:
Hypothesis 1. When factions have fewer policy divisions, peace agreements are
less likely to be reached, but when they are will more often pro-
duce a broad peace.
Hypothesis 2. When there are significant policy differences between opposition
factions, peace agreements are more likely to be agreed to, but
are less likely to bring about peace.
Hypothesis 3. Agreements that produce peace are more often made between a
target government and the stronger of the factions, rather than
the weaker faction.
In this chapter, I turn to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to establish that when
insurgent interests are more diverse or factionalized, target states are more likely to
negotiate with insurgents and more likely to be able to conclude peace settlements
with some faction of the insurgency than when insurgents are united. Furthermore,
the cases indicate that the increased likelihood of concluding an agreement is not
just the result of buying factions piecemeal as Cunningham (2011) argues. While
the theory and cases here support Cunningham’s divide and concede logic as one
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possible equilibrium, they also support a variant of the divide and conquer approach.
In this equilibrium, the state makes an offer to one faction that not only falls short
of satisfying other factions, but that stands to destabilize the power balance among
the factions, thereby threatening the status of excluded factions. In effect, the state
can make a relatively small offer to one faction and, in doing so, co-opt the efforts of
that faction toward fighting and repressing the remaining factions.
This chapter proceeds in several parts. First, I briefly review the alternative
explanations for both spoiler violence and the success or failure of peace negotiations
between a state and a factionalized insurgency, to allow for a comparison of the
hypotheses generated by my theory and those generated by the extant literature.
Next, I address the choice of the case study method for evaluating the theory presented
in Chapter 3. I then discuss the selection of cases and the comparability of the cases
I have chosen to consider. In the following section, I present my operationalization
of the relevant variables and how I have structured this study to maximize reliability
of the results. Having established the procedure for evaluating cases, I move to
individual narratives of the cases that address the individual cases’ values for each of
the relevant variables. Finally, I compare the cases across the variables and discuss
the implications of the results.
4.2 Alternative Explanations
In Chapter 2, I provide a review of the literature on commitment problems and fac-
tionalization in order to position my theory within the context of this wider literature.
What follows here is a more limited accounting of the alternative explanations for suc-
cessful implementation of a negotiated settlement. These explanations are included
here for the purpose of establishing the hypotheses against which I will evaluate
those listed in the previous section. Table 4.1 lists independent variables along with
the proposed direction of their effect according to previous literature. This Table is a
modified and extended version of Table 1.1 in Barbara Walter’s Committing to Peace:
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the Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (2002).
Hyp. Variable Hypothesized Effect on Probability
of Negotiation Success
A1 Costs of War (High) Increases
A2 Govt. and Challenger Parity Increases
A3 Democracy Increases
A4 Ethnic/Identity Issues Decreases
A5 Divisibility of Stakes Increases
A6 Mediator Increases
A7 Third Party Security Guarantee Increases
A8 Factionalization Increases
A9 Extremism Decreases
Table 4.1: Alternative Hypotheses for the Causes of Success and Failure in Conflict
Resolution
The effects of the cost of war are fairly straightforward - higher costs of con-
flict widen the bargaining range between the state and its opposition because when
the continuation of conflict is very costly, each side will have a lower utility for war
(Wittman 1979). Since it is true that the costs of war are non-trivial, then states
and their challengers should always be able to find a settlement they prefer to war
(Fearon 1995). In the event that locating an acceptable agreement is a challenge,
increasing costs of war should mitigate this challenge. As Walter (2002) notes, the
hypothesized effect of parity between a government and challenger reflects the effect
of balance in the international system proposed by Organski (1968) - that is to say
that parity is hypothesized to increase the chances of a negotiated resolution by in-
creasing the uncertainty that surrounds the decision to go to war. Democracy in the
target state is hypothesized to increase the chances of a successful resolution because
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of the domestic constraints that are proposed to increase the costs of using force on
a domestic population, the increased ability of democratic leaders to make credible
commitments, and a tradition of sharing power in government. This argument fol-
lows in the tradition of the democratic peace theory more generally, as espoused by
Russett (1993) and others. Ethnic identity is hypothesized to decrease the perceived
divisibility of stakes in civil conflict, increase the potential for identification and pun-
ishment of outgroup members if a settlement fails, and create disincentives for those
seeking compromise (Horowitz 2000, 2003; Kirschner 2010) All of this is expected to
decrease the probability that any compromise will be struck. In turn, the divisibility
of stakes increases the likelihood of negotiated settlement, as the high costs of war
mean that when dividing the contested issue is possible, there should always be some
division that is preferred by both sides to continued conflict (Fearon 1995). Media-
tors are argued to promote compromise by their ability to observe and communicate
the degree to which each side is cooperating and to provide external incentives for
cooperation (Regan and Aydin 2006). Walter adds that without third-party security
guarantees successful implementation of negotiated settlements is very rare due to
the vulnerability to defection that implementation produces on both sides (2002).
Alternative Hypotheses A8-A10 are all specifically related to the issue of faction-
alization within an opposition. Hypotheses A8 and A9 propose opposite effects of the
same variable - factionalization. Specifically, Nilsson proposes that as the number of
factions increase, the chances of weaker factions making peace deals with the gov-
ernment increases because when the opposition is very divided the government can
make very small offers of concessions to multiple small factions, effectively peeling
these factions away from the opposition (2010). In particular, Nilsson proposes that
when there are more than five factions in the opposition, deals with small factions
are more likely than when there are fewer factions. Nilsson makes no specific pre-
dictions regarding the chances for a broader peace settlement, but does argue that
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states negotiate with smaller factions in an effort to reduce the size and effectiveness
of the insurgency as a whole. In a related argument, Cunningham proposes states use
a divide and concede approach to factionalized insurgencies whereby the state uses
concessions to learn more about the nature of the insurgency and its factions or to
advantage moderate factions over their extreme counterparts (2011). When the state
offers a concession it can determine based on which groups accept that concession
which are the true moderates and which the true extremists by observing what fac-
tions accept the offer. Finally, the more traditional theories regarding the effect of
factionalization, suggest that increased factionalization may lead to barriers to peace
as a result of extremist violence (Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2002; Bueno de
Mesquita 2005). I contend that it is not the mere presence of factions that is signif-
icant for peace prospects. Rather, it is the relative strength of the factions and how
much (or little) they have in common.
4.3 Method of Evaluation
4.3.1 Why Case Studies?
I use case studies to evaluate the hypotheses generated by the formal model because
instances of peace agreements between a target state and a faction of a fragmented
insurgency are rare events, and large-n data do not exist. Furthermore, while the sec-
ond variable of interest in this project, relative factional strength, might be measured
with a reasonable degree of confidence for a large-n method, for the first variable,
degree of unity or disunity among factions, conceptual validity would be very difficult
to establish without the use of case study methods which allow for the considera-
tion of context in determining the value a variable takes in a given case (George and
Bennett, 2005).
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4.3.2 Structure of the Analysis
I use the comparative case study method which Kaarbo and Beasley define as “the
systematic comparison of two or more data points (“cases”) obtained through use of
the case study method” (1999, p. 372) and George and Bennett among others extend
to include within-case analysis (2005). The comparative case study method allows
for the comparison of cases that are very similar in many potentially relevant areas
(comparable cases), but differ with regard to the theorized independent variables.
By holding as many variables as possible, short of the theorized causal variables,
constant across cases, if the cases have different outcomes, then we can attribute this
difference to the changes in the theorized independent variables. In selecting cases
for comparison, King, Keohane, and Verba advise that “the best ‘intentional’ design
selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable” (1994, 140), while
cautioning that researchers should be wary of the pitfall of selecting cases on both
the dependent and independent variables.
All of the cases used in this analysis are drawn from a single long-running conflict
- namely the conflict over the future of Palestine. From this conflict, I draw four
distinct cases. I chose the four cases described below because each has a unique
combination of values on the two independent variables. By drawing cases from
a single conflict over time, I am able to hold many other factors constant across
the cases, thus ensuring comparability. In the following section, I explain the case
selection in greater detail, and introduce the cases and the expectations for each case
as derived from the hypotheses above.
4.4 Case Selection
The theory evaluated here proposes an explanation for when peace agreements will
be made, with whom they will be made, and how likely they are to produce a broad
peace among all parties to the conflict, given a conflict between a factionalized armed
opposition and a target state. An evaluation of the theory therefore requires testing
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its fit against cases drawn from the universe of those in which a state faces a challenge
from an insurgency divided into at least two factions. The Palestinian case fits into
the universe of cases to which the theory is applicable in that the Israeli government
faces such an insurgency over a period of several decades. In the following paragraphs,
I outline the reasons for both my decision to draw all four cases from a single conflict
and to draw from the conflict over Palestine in particular.
First, as established earlier, drawing four distinct cases from the history of a single
conflict allows for a measure of control across cases. It is important to hold constant
other variables that might be responsible for the change in outcome across cases to
avoid the potential for omitted variable bias (King et al. 1994). By using cases drawn
from the same conflict, I am able to hold constant the geographic context, the regime
type of the target state, and, to a lesser degree as cases are chosen across time, the
historical and cultural contexts of the conflict, and the nature and other aspects of
the environment. Below, I identify several variables from the alternative hypotheses
that are held constant across these cases in order to limit the number of possible
explanatory variables.
Critically, during the course of the conflict, there has been variation in the via-
bility of different Palestinian factions and in the relative strength of those factions.
Furthermore, while Fatah has remained a constant participant in the conflict for the
past half century, the other factions claiming to represent the Palestinians have varied
- as have the goals of those factions and their degree of common cause with Fatah.
Though Hamas has maintained its place as the second most powerful Palestinian fac-
tion since its rise to prominence in the late 1980s, even Hamas has changed its stance
toward Fatah in recent years. This variation in variables of interest within the con-
text of a single conflict allows me to compare how changes in the relative strength of
factions influence which, if any, faction the Israeli state chooses to negotiate with and
the outcome of those negotiations. This within-case comparison over time provides
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some limited control for the effect of ideology on the state’s negotiating decisions.
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been used in the development or analysis of
several of the prominent alternative theories of factionalization and spoiling behavior
(Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Kydd and Walter 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson
2007; Pearlman 2009). This makes the conflict over Palestine something of a crucial
case in the sense that it is the proving ground on which any new theory may be
compared to the existing alternatives. While the theory promoted here offers an
explanation for the success or failure of peace processes, it does so specifically for
the universe of civil conflicts characterized by factionalization. It is appropriate to
evaluate a new advancement in the theory of spoiling behavior against earlier theories
using the case that has been used to evaluate more of the previous theories than any
other. If the logic of my own explanation is not supported in this case at least as well
as that of previous explanations, it will be imperative to address the reasons for this.
Another reason for using the Israeli-Palestinian case is that, relative to the universe
of civil conflict cases, this conflict is well-documented. The dangers inherent in civil
conflict impede good documentation of most of these conflicts. While coverage of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still imperfect, there are multiple data sources including
B’Tselem, the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research, Jerusalem Media & Communications Media, and news
wire services, such as Reuters and Agence France-Presse (AFP), operating in the area.
The documentation of this conflict by both impartial groups and by organizations with
affiliations with either side allows me to present a more complete picture of the causal
process in this conflict than is possible in conflicts that are poorly documented.
4.4.1 Four Cases
Case selection is very important for the conduct of comparative case studies. As King,
Keohane, and Verba note, in small-N analysis, it may be inappropriate to select cases
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randomly as this may not allow for sufficient variation on the variables of interest
(1994). Instead, they propose that researchers in small-N analysis should select cases
“in an intentional fashion, consistent with our research objectives and strategy....
We are least likely to be fooled when cases are selected based on categories of the
explanatory variables” (139). Consistent with this approach, I pull periods from the
more recent history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on their values on the
two independent variables: relative strength of the opposition factions and degree of
divisiveness among the factions. I identify four distinct moments from the conflict
such that each case has a unique combination of values of the two variables of interest,
parity and divisiveness. The independent variables are both coded on a high/low
dichotomy. In what follows, I identify the four cases evaluated here, provide a brief
explanation of my coding decisions with regard to the independent variables for each
case, and apply the hypotheses above to predict what we should see in each case with
regard to negotiations. I then evaluate the overall fit of the hypotheses to the cases.
The first case I identify is a period characterized by both low parity, that is one
faction is dominant, and low divisiveness, indicating that the factions have relatively
high common interest. This period is that of the early 1980s. Fatah dominated
Palestinian politics during this period and the Islamist movement had not yet emerged
as a true political force in Palestine. Fatah’s primary opposition during this period
was the Rejectionist Front - a group of factions that opposed the Ten Point Program
adopted at the 12th Palestinian National Council in 1974, which opened the door to a
potential two state solution or bi-national state. Though the Rejectionist Front groups
opposed the PLO’s strategy, its member groups espoused similar secular, pan-Arab,
and socialist ideology. Hypotheses 1 above indicates that in this case peace agreements
are less likely to be reached than when there are more significant policy divisions, but
if a peace agreement is reached, it will be more likely to be implemented than if there
were greater divisiveness. Hypothesis 3 suggests that if a peace agreement is reached
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during this period, it should be made with the strongest faction, Fatah. Notice that,
as the complement to Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 is supported when Hypothesis
1 is supported in cases of greater opposition cohesiveness and the predictions of
Hypothesis 2 are borne out in cases of lower opposition cohesiveness.
The second case is one of low parity as before, but high divisiveness. The years
from roughly 1990 to about 1995 are representative of such a period in the Palestinian
conflict. Hamas emerged in 1988 during the First Intifada. Hamas did have a measure
of popularity primarily as an offshoot of the charitably oriented Muslim Brotherhood
and as an alternative for those who had grown disenchanted with Fatah, and the
period was a difficult one for Fatah in many respects. However, as I establish in
this chapter, even Hamas recognized that it did not have the sort of wide-spread
entrenched support that Fatah and the PLO did during this period. Whereas Fatah’s
previous rivals held ideologies similar to Fatah’s own, Hamas emerged as a religious
organization with a strong preference for religious policies and governance in Palestine.
Although Hamas sought to avoid an outright armed conflict with Fatah (which Hamas
knew it would lose), there were episodes of fighting between members of the two
organizations (Mishal and Sela 2000). As in Case 1 above, Hypothesis 3 predicts
that any peace agreement struck during this period should be made with Fatah, the
strongest of the factions. The predictions generated by Hypothesis 2 are the reverse
of those made from Hypothesis 1 in Case 1. Hypothesis 2 suggests that a peace deal
will be more likely to be reached in Case 2 than in Case 1 where there factions are
more unified. However, any deal that is reached will be less likely to produce a broad
peace in this case than if it were reached in the previous case. As with Hypothesis
2 in cases of low divisiveness, support for Hypothesis 1 can be drawn from cases of
high divisiveness when Hypothesis 2 is supported, so long as it is also the case that
support for Hypothesis 1 is found in cases of low divisiveness.
The criteria for the third case in this analysis are high levels of both parity and
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divisiveness, which characterized the period from about 2001 to 2007. The Oslo Ac-
cords of 1993 and 1995 had prolonged Fatah’s hold on its position of dominance in
Palestinian politics and slowed Hamas’ rise to power. However, in the late 1990s, Fa-
tah began to decline in organizational strength and popularity. Fatah was plagued by
rampant corruption, and expanding Jewish settlements, Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s
decision to delay implementation of the Wye River Agreement of 1998, declining eco-
nomic conditions in Palestine, and Israel’s heavy-handed response to the Palestinian
demonstrations that marked the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada combined to further
diminish Palestinian confidence in Fatah’s ability to produce peace with Israel on ac-
ceptable terms. At the same time, support for Hamas was on the rise; Mia Bloom
finds that although crackdowns by Fatah and Israel had lowered support for Hamas
to 10 per cent in 1999, popular support for Hamas increased dramatically through
the course of the Second Intifada (2005). Indeed, public opinion polls conducted
in Palestine in April 2003 indicate that levels of trust in Fatah (22.6 % trust) and
Hamas (22% trust) were nearly even (Jerusalem Media & Communications Centre
2003). Meanwhile, the policy agendas of the two organizations remained at odds. As
in Case 2, Hypothesis 2 would suggest that a peace deal is more likely to be reached
in Case 3 than in Case 1, but, again, any deal that is reached will be less likely to
produce a broad peace in this case than if it were reached under conditions of lower
divisiveness. The model suggests that when factional power is close to parity, smaller
government offers may be accepted - suggesting that deals may be more likely. How-
ever, there is reason to believe that offers made to groups near parity will be less likely
to produce peace than deals made with a clearly dominant faction since the recipient
may have less ability to enforce a deal. Because this suggests that deals may be less
likely when factions are near parity, we can make no clear prediction regarding the
probability of a deal. In the event that a deal is struck, Hypothesis 3 still predicts
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that it will be made with the (in this case marginally) stronger of the factions. De-
termining which faction is stronger in periods of near parity will be difficult, as small
fluctuations in power can tilt the balance and measurements of the exact relative
power relationships of armed opposition groups do not tend to be precise. However,
given that approval ratings remained ever so slightly higher for Fatah than Hamas
through much of the period and international support was certainly higher for Fatah,
we can speculate that Israel would have chosen Fatah as a negotiating partner prior
to Hamas’ electoral victory.
The final case is one of high parity and low divisiveness. In the conflict over Pales-
tine, the period from approximately 2010 through the present is most representative
of these values. In February of 2010, Hamas and Fatah entered talks, and on May
4, they signed an agreement aimed at reconciliation in the wake of the 2007 conflict
over the Gaza Strip. Efforts at a full reconciliation have continued into 2012 despite
opposition from Israel, which has warned Fatah, that it cannot have dealings with
both Hamas and Israel. Although both groups maintain their distinct ideological
leanings, deteriorating economic conditions due to the Israeli blockade of Gaza and
restrictions on travel and transportation of goods from the West Bank along with
continued expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank have combined to de-
crease faith in talks with Israel. This decrease in trust coupled with indications from
Hamas that it might be willing to accept a two state solution have given both groups
greater incentive to cooperate against Israel. Both factions maintain a significant
degree of power and popularity. Again, Hypothesis 1 suggests a lower likelihood of
a deal between Israel and any Palestinian faction than in Cases 2 and 3, but also
indicates that, if a deal is reached, it will more likely be fulfilled in this case than in
either Case 2 or 3. Without a precise method for measuring factional power, it will
not be possible to adequately evaluate Hypothesis 3 in this case.
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4.5 Operationalization of the Variables
As indicated in the previous section, I code both independent variables on a high/low
dichotomy. For example, low parity indicates that there is a dominant faction, while
high parity indicates that the factions are somewhat balanced in their capabilities.
I conceive of factional capabilities as a faction’s ability to make demands on the
government, which is a function of the faction’s ability to impose costs on the gov-
ernment, wrest territory from the government, or defeat the government in an armed
conflict. More precisely, capabilities of the factions relative to each other, as opposed
to the opposition capabilities relative to those of the government, are conceptualized
as the probability with which one faction would disarm the other given that the fac-
tions fought.1 Low divisiveness indicates that the factions are relatively unified in
their preferences, and there is a greater degree of factional cohesion, cooperation, and
trust. When divisiveness is low, each faction can be expected to gain utility from the
other’s material or political gains relative to Israel. High divisiveness, on the other
hand, indicates that the factions are closer to rivals than to partners - trust is low,
and we can expect to see more open hostility between the factions.
It is important to note that the variables are not coded for each faction, rather a
common code is assigned to each case. This means that the value that one faction
places on the gains of another must be the same value that other faction has for the
gains of the first faction.
The dependent variables are the negotiation of a peace agreement, its success-
ful implementation, and the opposition faction included in negotiations. As is well
known, the conflict over Palestine is ongoing, therefore we should not expect to ob-
serve an agreement that resolves the conflict. However, there have been many efforts
1I assume that the balance of relative capabilities would not be altered by the occurrence of
conflict between factions although Mishal and Sela indicate that, at least in 1992, Hamas believed
that if its actions sparked widespread conflict between itself and Hamas, it would lose much of its
support from within Palestine (2000).
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made at achieving peace over the history of this conflict, and it is possible to evaluate
whether attempts were made in a given case and the effects of these attempts relative
to each other.
To the degree possible, I evaluate the alternative hypotheses, however it is useful to
note that the cases were selected on the basis of the independent variables identified by
the three hypotheses established in Chapter 3. This means that it may not be possible
to fully evaluate the effects of each variable listed in Table 4.1 above. The research
design does control for some of these variables - including degree of factionalization
(although the number of factions changes across time, in each of the four cases, the
Palestinian opposition is factionalized and divided into no fewer than five distinct
factions), regime type of the target state, the presence of ethnic or identity issues in
the conflict, and involvement of a mediator (throughout the course of the conflict there
are many willing mediatory - most notably the United States and Norway). Because
each of these variables is held constant throughout the cases, variation in outcomes
cannot be attributed to these variables. Additionally, the use of cases drawn from a
common conflict allows me to control for various other factors that could influence the
potential for successful implementation of peace agreements including international
status of the conflict, media freedoms in the target state, and economic or geographic
factors among others. By minimizing “variability in other variables that may affect
the investigated relationship” it is possible to increase confidence that the proposed
causal variables are in fact responsible for changes in the dependent variable (Kaarbo
and Beasley 1999).
4.6 Cases
4.6.1 Case 1: Low Parity; Low Divisiveness: 1977-1983
The Front of Palestinian Forces Rejecting Solutions of Surrender (Rejectionist Front)
formed in opposition to the Fatah supported Ten Point Program - specifically Point 2
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- which was adopted at the 12th session of the Palestinian National Committee (PNC)
in 1974. The Rejectionist Front consisted of several opposition groups, chief among
them the Democratic and Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP
and PFLP, respectively). The differences between Fatah and the members of the
Rejectionist Front, many of them also PLO members, seem to have been more tactical
than ideological at this point. The Rejectionist Front groups opposed the second of
theTen Points adopted at the 1974 PNC because its wording suggested that the PLO
would be willing to accept a two state solution. However, like Fatah, the Front’s
member groups espoused a secular, pan-Arab, and socialist ideology. The primary
difference then between Fatah and the Rejectionist Front groups is that the Front
was still strongly opposed to sending any signal of willingness to compromise on the
point of a single Palestinian state over the full contested territory and the territory
of the Israeli state. This was not a difference of ideology but one of tactics - where
Fatah was prepared to begin considering proposals from Israel, the Rejectionist Front
preferred to continue the fight until it could gain greater strength and force larger
concessions.
Despite the support of Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the Rejectionist Front was no
match for Fatah. Fatah won control of the PLO in 1969, not long after it joined
the organization in the wake of the Six Day War and the Battle of Karameh in
which Fatah fighters imposed high casualties on Israeli forces invading a Fatah base
(Pearlman 2012). Pearlman writes that Fatah’s performance in the Battle of Karameh
transformed the way Palestinians were viewed (and the way many viewed themselves),
and led to a rush of Palestinians eager to join the ranks of Fatah. In the period
following the Battle, Fatah’s ranks increased dramatically, such that it was soon the
largest of the Palestinian movements (Pearlman 2012). Further increasing Fatah’s
strength, the Arab League Summit in Rabat declared the PLO the only legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people in 1974, and the United Nations followed suit
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with the passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 3210.2
Hypothesis 1 predicts that peace agreements are less likely to be reached when
organizations are more cohesive than when there are more significant policy divisions,
but if a peace agreement is reached, it is more likely to be implemented than if there
were greater divisiveness. In this case then, we should expect that peace agreements
will be unlikely to occur since the divisions within the PLO were primarily over tactics
rather than ideology. In the event that a peace agreement does occur in this period,
we should expect that it will likely be implemented since the occurrence of peace
agreements in the presence of high opposition cohesion suggests that the terms of
the agreement are somewhat favorable to both opposition factions. Although peace
agreements in this period are unlikely to occur, in the event that one does occur,
Hypothesis 3 predicts that it should be made with the strongest faction, Fatah. Recall
that, as the complement to Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 is supported when Hypothesis
1 is supported in cases of greater opposition cohesiveness and the predictions of
Hypothesis 2 are borne out in cases of lower opposition cohesiveness.
In line with the first prediction of Hypothesis 1, peace agreements between the
Palestinians and Israel were not reached during this period. However, in the absence
of a peace agreement, it is not possible to determine whether one would have been im-
plemented had it occurred. The absence of a peace agreement supports the prediction
that peace agreements are unlikely when divisiveness is low, however no inferences
can be made regarding the prediction that signed peace agreements are more likely
to be implemented when cohesiveness is high.
As there was no peace agreement concluded between the Palestinians and Israel
during this period, nor did the Israeli government approach either side to initiate
peace talks, evaluation of Hypothesis 3 is not feasible in this case.
2Recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinian interests from the United
States and Israel did not follow until the Oslo Accord of 1993.
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It should be noted that the first of the Camp David Accords of 1978, between
the United States, Israel, and Egypt, established a framework for negotiating a peace
between Israel and the Palestinians and Arab states, which pledged to include the
representatives of the Palestinians in the process of negotiating the future of the con-
tested territories. It is not clear that this referred to the PLO, since the United States
and Israel had not yet recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian
people. Also, all Palestinian representatives were excluded from the process of nego-
tiating the terms of the Accords. Israel probably negotiated with Egypt rather than
any Palestinian faction because Egypt provided much of the support on which the
Palestinians relied. That Israel agreed to the Camp David Accords indicates an in-
terest on Israel’s part in finding a negotiated resolution to the conflict over Palestine,
however the Israeli’s chose not to negotiate directly with the Palestinians until 1993.
4.6.2 Case 2: Low Parity; High Divisiveness: 1990-1995
Hamas, the most prominent of the Islamist Palestinian groups, grew out of the Muslim
Brotherhood operations in Palestine. A traffic accident that killed four Palestinians
in early December of 1987 marked the beginning of the period that came to be known
as the First Intifada. It was in the early days of the Intifada that Hamas emerged as
a distinct organization.
Hamas grew rapidly during the Intifada, its appeal increased by its association
with the Muslim Brotherhood’s social programs. But, even as of 1992, it was clear
that Hamas was still no match for the more established secular Fatah movement and
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) over which it presided. Tellingly, a
secret memo circulated among the Hamas leadership in late July, 1992, highlights the
conundrum Hamas expected to face in the event that negotiations between the PLO
and Israel resulted in Palestinian elections. Specifically, Hamas recognized that if it
called for a boycott of elections, “no matter how successful we may be in preventing
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people from participating, the voter turnout will be no less than 30 to 40 percent
of the electorate.... it would not be enough to disrupt the elections” and failure to
disrupt the elections would, Hamas feared, make it appear weak (reprinted in Mishal
and Sela 2000, 126). Worse yet, if Hamas attempted to forcibly disrupt elections,
it feared it would not have the capacity to stand up to Fatah and Israel and that
the resulting bloodshed would turn the Palestinian people against it. On the other
hand, if Hamas participated in elections, “Most of the estimates show that we might
not be able to win a majority... we would lose them and, at the same time, grant
legitimacy to the negotiations” (129). The Hamas leadership clearly recognized that
it had not yet attained the strength it would need to challenge Fatah directly, and
worried that an agreement between Fatah and Israel would stunt Hamas’ own chances
for growth and representation. This assessment of Hamas’ strength relative to that
of Fatah and the PLO is highlighted by the results of a poll conducted in February
of 1993 in which 56% of West Bank participants and 66% of those in the Gaza Strip
responded that the PLO represents the Palestinian people, while only 10.5% and
16.6% respectively of the same populations responded that the Islamic movements
represent the Palestinians (the alternatives were “True representation can only be
achieved through direct elections” and “Other, please specify”) (Jerusalem Media &
Communications Centre 1993).
Hamas’ predicament was complicated by the fact that it did not trust Fatah and
the PLO to represent its values. Fatah and the other PLO members were secular
organizations that included many non-Muslim participants (the PFLP, for example,
was founded and led by George Habash, a Palestinian Christian). Hamas had its roots
in Muslim social outreach and sought a Palestinian state founded on Islamic law and
principles, while the PLO members sought a secular, democratic state founded on
Marxist principles. Hamas fundamentally disagreed with the PLO’s secularism. In a
1993 evaluation of the role of Hamas in Palestinian civil society and comparison of
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Hamas and its PLO rivals, Muslih writes that, “in terms of a program of political
and social action, what emerges is a vision based on a non-PLO, and in some re-
spects even anti-PLO, ideology of religion intended to give support to the ideology of
nationalism” (1993). Although Hamas as a movement was new, the Muslim Broth-
erhood already had a history of competition and rivalry with the secular factions in
the universities and civic life of the Palestinian territories, which Hamas carried on
after its establishment.
As established previously, in accordance with Hypothesis 2 we can expect that, in
this case, an agreement between Israel and some faction of the Palestinians will likely
be achieved, but is less likely to be implemented than if the Palestinian factions were
more ideologically cohesive. Further, in accordance with Hypothesis 3, we can expect
that, if Israel makes a deal with any faction in this case, it will deal with Fatah as
the stronger faction.
Indeed, as the hypotheses predict and as the Hamas leadership feared, Israel did
conclude an agreement with Fatah in 1993 for limited self-rule of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Prior to the accords, the Palestinian Liberation Organization Charter
called for armed struggle to overthrow Israel and denied the right of the state of
Israel to exist. With the accords, however, Arafat, leader of Fatah and chairman of
the PLO, accepted Israel’s right to exist within its 1948 borders and renounced the use
of terrorism, pledging to suppress its use by others in Palestine. In return, Israel did
not permit Palestinian statehood, but instead acknowledged the PLO, still dominated
by Arafat’s Fatah party, as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Hamas,
as a non-member of the PLO, was excluded from many of the benefits this brought.
Israel maintained military rights in Palestine, but allowed for the development of a
police force within Palestine. The Oslo agreement maintained the rights of Israeli
settlers in Palestine, and paved the way for Israeli annexation of Jerusalem and a
large chunk of the West Bank.
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This agreement, the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government (DOP),
represented an historic moment in the conflict over Palestine. It was the first time
that Israel and the PLO were able to reach such an agreement, limited as it was.
However, Hamas challenged that this agreement did not go far enough. Arafat had
acknowledged Israel’s right of existence as a state, but had not gained such an ac-
knowledgement from Israel for Palestine. Arafat had compromised on issues that were
vital to many Palestinians, such as the status of Jerusalem and the right of return
for Palestinian refugees, in order to maintain the relevance of his own Fatah party.
The concessions he had gained benefited Fatah at the expense of the broader Pales-
tinian population. Hamas and Islamic Jihad protested the agreement, and engaged
in attacks against Israel and sporadic violence against Fatah members.
It has been argued by many that Hamas was opposed to any form of compromise,
but this argument is not well supported by the evidence. Hamas has shown itself
to be open to compromise agreements as long as they are temporary in nature. As
Mishal and Sela observe, “Hamas is not a prisoner of its own dogma.... Hamas oper-
ates in a context of opportunities and constraints, being attentive to the fluctuating
needs of and desires of the Palestinian population and cognizant of power relations
and political feasibility” (2000, viii). In other words, Hamas is not the irrational,
uncompromising, extremist group it has been painted as. Rather, Hamas is a ratio-
nal strategic actor responding to the political realities it faces. Hamas opposed the
deal between Israel and Fatah because this deal recognized the Fatah-led PLO as the
legitimate representative of the Palestinians in the international community, demon-
strated domestically that Fatah was capable of providing tangible movements towards
peace (however limited they might be), and set the stage for elections before Hamas
was prepared to challenge Fatah democratically. All of this advantaged Fatah’s goal
for a secular Palestine over Hamas’ goal for an Islamic society in Palestine.
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that although a deal was reached between Israel and Fa-
tah, that deal should be unlikely to produce a broad peace between Israel and the
Palestinians. Indeed, as mentioned above, the Islamist groups, particularly Hamas
and Islamic Jihad, that did not feel their interests were addressed in this deal used
violence, including a campaign of suicide attacks to demonstrate their resistance to
the peace process.
The inability of Fatah and the newly created Palestinian Authority (PA) to stop
the violence from the Islamist groups seems likely to have contributed to growing
Israeli dissatisfaction with and the eventual collapse of the peace process. Kimmerling
and Migdal conclude that the Hamas militants had “virtual veto power over the
negotiations, because every outrageous act that they perpetrated brought yet another
interruption” (2003, 378). The peace process began to stall as Jewish settlements in
the Palestinian territories continued to expand. After the assassination of Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Likud Party and Benjamin Netanyahu came to
power aided by the ill will that Hamas’ suicide campaign had created within Israel
towards the peace process. Netanyahu had made his own disapproval of the Oslo
Accords evident since the process began, and with the rise of Likud the process
began to further unravel.
4.6.3 Case 3: High Parity; High Divisiveness: 2001-2007
The peace process stumbled along through the rest of the 1990s. The Oslo Accords
signed in 1993 and 1995, had prolonged Fatah’s hold on power and temporarily in-
sulated it against the threat that the Islamist movement represented. However, as
more deadlines were missed on the implementation of both these agreements, hope
began to falter. A Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC) opinion poll
conducted in August of 1998 indicated significant declines from December 1996 levels
in Palestinian support for the peace process (down from 78.1% to 55.6%), support
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for Fatah (down from 42% to 32.6%), and trust in Arafat (down from 42% to 32.6%)
(1998). In October of 1998, Israel and Palestinian Authority President (and Fatah
leader) Yasser Arafat signed the Wye Rive Agreement, essentially a recommitment
to the plans laid out in Oslo I and II, however, neither the Wye River Agreement or
the Sharm el-Sheik Agreement that followed in September 1999 produced the results
Arafat needed to regain broad support for the peace process. JMCC opinion poll
results indicate that these agreements did boost the popularity of Fatah and Arafat
at least temporarily. But, in the context of declining trust in the peace process over
time and increasing perceptions of corruption in the Palestinian Authority,3 Arafat
and Fatah were both experiencing a steady decline in popularity over the latter half
of the 1990s. The JMCC summary of its October 1999 opinion poll is indicative of
this trend when compared to the results reported above. In the October 1999 poll
summary, the JMCC reported, “There is a significant increase in the popularity of
President Yasser Arafat, where the Palestinians who trust the President rose from
(28%) last August, prior to signing the Sharm Sheik Agreement, to (32%) in this
poll” (1999). Notice that, as reported above, JMCC had found trust in Arafat was
down to 32.6% in 1998.
As implementation of these new agreements stalled, Palestinian trust in Arafat
and the peace process continued to decline. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and
Arafat met at Camp David in July 2000 for another effort at peace. But the Camp
David talks fell apart, as did the Taba Summit that followed in January 2001. In the
interim, Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount (also the site of the
al-Aqsa Mosque), along with a contingent of hundreds of riot police, sparked protests
that would develop into the al-Aqsa Intifada. Responding to Palestinian protests,
Israel used substantial, often lethal, force, even against non-violent protestors (Caplan
3A poll conducted in Palestine in September 1996 indicated that 49.3% of respondents believed
there was corruption in the PA (only 27.1% did not believe there was corruption) (Center for
Palestinian Research and Studies Survey Research Unit 1996).
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2010).
The combined efforts of Israel and Fatah to cut off external aid to Hamas had
lowered Hamas’ support to 10 per cent in 1999, yet support for the Islamist movement
increased dramatically through the course of the al-Aqsa Intifada (Bloom 2005). The
Intifada and the willingness of Israel to resort to lethal force in countering protests
indicated that Fatah’s efforts to produce peace through negotiations were not working.
PA attempts to end the violence through the Sharm el-Sheik Agreement of 2000 and
the Taba Summit collapsed quickly, contributing to the Palestinian mistrust in the
peace process. JMCC public opinion polls from April 2003 indicate that levels of
Palestinian trust in Fatah (22.6 % trust) and Hamas (22% trust) were nearly even
by that point (2003). Suicide attacks from the Islamist movements increased early in
the Intifada, and Bloom finds that, in a departure from the 1990s, support for suicide
attacks began to rise from November of 2000 (2005).
Meanwhile, the policy agendas of Hamas and Fatah were no closer than they had
been a decade earlier. The efforts of the Palestinian Authority, referenced above, in
collaboration with Israel to cut off external funding to Hamas - the money that en-
abled the very social services through which Hamas had built its network - confirmed
for Hamas that Fatah would not protect its interests. Furthermore, the Palestinian
Authority under Fatah had used its security forces to arrest and detain Hamas mem-
bers and activists. Referring back to Figure 1.1 adds to this picture of factional
discord as it shows violence increasing as a percentage of all dyadic events between
Palestinian factions. The very incident that the sparked the Intifada underlined again
the differences between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas called on Palestinian Muslims to
protest Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount site. A Hamas statement made on the eve
of the Sharm el-Sheik Agreement of 2000, berates Arafat and the PA for its involve-
ment in the talks, “The laying of the cornerstone [for the proposed Jewish Temple at
the al-Aqsa site]... will also coincide with the PA president’s acquiescence to Baraq’s
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demands to renew the arrest of the Hamas leaders, who have been released by the
masses from the authority’s prisons” (“Hamas issues...” 2000). This statement under-
scores the mistrust that years of Fatah rule in the territories had produced between
Hamas and Fatah.
As Hamas’ power continued to rise through the course of the Second Intifada,
hostilities between the secular and religious factions only increased. When Hamas
swept to a surprising 2006 electoral victory, taking 76 of 132 Parliamentary seats,
Fatah, backed by western interests, resisted the transfer of power in the territory.
This led to intense factional fighting in Gaza through 2007, when Hamas pushed
Fatah’s forces out of the Gaza Strip while Fatah maintained control of the West
Bank
As in the previous case, Hypothesis 2 predicts that a peace deal, though more
likely to be reached than when the Palestinian movement is more cohesive, will be
less likely to produce a broad peace than if it were reached under conditions of lower
divisiveness. In the event that a deal is struck, Hypothesis 3 still predicts that it
will be made with the (in this case marginally) stronger of the factions. However,
determining which faction is stronger in periods of near parity will be difficult as small
fluctuations in power can tilt the balance and measurements of the exact relative
power relationships of armed opposition groups do not tend to be precise.
In line with Hypothesis 2, there is evidence of many attempts to negotiate a
peace settlement between Israel and Fatah during this period. The Taba Summit,
undertaken in the early days of 2001, marks the first attempt during this period. The
Summit concluded with a joint statement by negotiators from both the PA and Israel
noting, “The sides declare they have never been closer to reaching an agreement... the
two sides are convinced that in a short period of time... it will be possible to bridge
the differences remaining and attain a permanent settlement of peace between them”
(Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001). That Taba failed to produce a workable
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peace settlement is also consistent with Hypothesis 2.
There were several high profile external proposals for the resolution of the conflict
during this period. The 2003 Road Map for Peace is perhaps the best known of
these failed plans, but there were others. The Geneva Accord was hammered out
between Israeli and Palestinian government representatives with Swiss mediation for
two years ending in December 2003. The Accord called for concessions by both
sides, but would have granted to the Palestinians much of the West Bank. Again,
consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, the Accord was not successfully implemented,
but it resurfaced in 2009 for continued discussion.
Though it is difficult to adequately test Hypothesis 3 in this case, note that the
agreements made between Israel and Fatah preceded the election of Hamas in the
Gaza Strip. Also, as mentioned earlier, as of April 2003, Hamas and Fatah were
approaching equal levels of trust as reflected in public opinion polls. An April 2003
poll indicates that 81% of Palestinians polled believed there was corruption in the
PA, by June the figure had increased to 84%. The same June 2003 poll shows support
for Hamas up to 22% (from 17% in April) and Fatah support holding steady at 26%
(Center for Palestinian Research and Studies Survey Research Unit 2003a and 2003b).
With a 3% margin of error in the June poll, we can say that by that time there was
no statistically significant difference in the support levels of the two factions, though
the difference was significant as late as April. The Geneva Accord was announced
months later in December of 2003, at which time Fatah seems to have been holding
a bare lead over Hamas. However, at the time negotiations commenced and for most
of the two year period in which they occurred, opinion polls reflect a wider margin of
support for Fatah. This suggests tentative support for Hypothesis 3.
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4.6.4 Case 4: High Parity; Low Divisiveness: 2010-present
The previous case period saw relations between Hamas and Fatah turn from merely
contentious to violent, resulting in a period of internal conflict in 2006 and 2007 that
has been called a civil war. The conflict resulted in separate governance of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip and repression of dissidence in both territories.
The high degree of parity achieved by the factions during the previous period
has not dissipated. Support for Hamas is not as high as it was in 2006, but bleak
economic conditions and continuing internal divisions have also dampened public
support for and organizational effectiveness of Fatah (Lagerquist 2011). Instead, in
the wake of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in which the United Nations found Israel used
“disproportionate force” and committed actions constituting torture and war crimes
(U.N. Human Rights Council 2009, 524), the rival Palestinian factions have begun to
move toward reconciliation and unification.
Concrete progress toward reconciliation of the dominant religious and secular
Palestinian factions began in late February of 2009, barely more than a month after
the end of the Gaza War. Representatives of Fatah and Hamas met in Cairo for Egyp-
tian mediated talks. The talks began with the establishment of five committees aimed
at addressing the major issues associated with reunification. Through these commit-
tees, the rival factions began to find some common ground and Hamas indicated its
flexibility on a number of potentially contentious issues. In an interview with the New
York Times in early March, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal said that his party “has
accepted a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders... The priority is ending the Isreali
occupation and achieving the national project.... As the people choose their repre-
sentatives, they will choose their program too” (“Transcript: Interview With Khaled
Meshal of Hamas” 2009). These statements reflect the evolving views of the Hamas
leadership towards a more cooperative relationship with Fatah, as well as Hamas’
increased popularity, which gives it more to gain from democratic representation in
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Palestine than it had in the 1990s. Meshal indicated his belief that Hamas had won
the right to implement its own political programs through its 2006 electoral victory,
but his statements suggested a willingness to accept a unity government with Fatah.
Continuing the process of reconciliation of the Palestinian factions, Hamas and
Fatah returned to Cairo in the late Spring of 2011 for a series of secret meetings in
response to mass demonstrations in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip demand-
ing reconciliation. These meetings resulted in a signed agreement between the two
parties calling for the establishment of a care-taker government in preparation for
national elections to mark the beginning of a unity government. Israel rejected the
agreement between Hamas and Fatah, and Netanyahu announced, “The Palestinian
Authority must choose either peace with Israel or peace with Hamas. There is no
possibility for peace with both” (“Fatah and Hamas Sign Reconciliation Deal” 2011).
That Fatah proceeded with the agreement despite Netanyahu’s warning that doing
so would disrupt the continuation of Fatah’s relationship with Israel - and despite
Israel’s move to stop sending Palestinian tax dollars to the Palestinian Authority -
indicates a reconsideration on Fatah’s part regarding both its relationship with Israel
and the extent of its differences with Hamas.
Although a unity government over the Palestinian territories has not yet been
established, the major Palestinian factions are closer to unity than they have been in
prior years. Earlier in the year, Hamas and Fatah signed the Doha Accord, paving
the way for the election of a unity government. Implementation of Doha was delayed
when Hamas halted the work of the election committee in Gaza. However, in May the
factions signed a new agreement in Cairo pledging to begin implementation of Doha
immediately. A Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in March
and a JMCC poll in May show support for reconciliation and the election of a unity
government (2012). The same JMCC poll indicates declines in trust of both parties
throughout the territories as corruption continues to plague Fatah (the March PSR
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survey indicates 72.9% of those surveyed believed there was corruption in the Fatah
government of Abu Mazin; by comparison, 61.6% believed there was corruption in
the Hamas government of the Gaza Strip), while Hamas suffers financially from both
the international reaction to its continued refusal to recognize the state of Israel and
the decline of its sponsor states (2012).
Hypothesis 1 suggests that the increased unity of the Palestinian factions dur-
ing this period will decrease the likelihood of any peace agreement between Israel
and either of the factions. This is because factions that are more closely united will
require greater concessions in order to accept a peace deal since the payoffs to con-
tinued conflict for each faction are higher when the movement is more cohesive, and
the state may be unwilling to pay sufficiently high concessions. Indeed, Netanyahu’s
2011 statement that “The Palestinian Authority must choose either peace with Israel
or peace with Hamas” indicates that Israel is unwilling to deal with the unified in-
surgency (“Fatah and Hamas Sign Reconciliation Deal” 2011). That neither faction
concluded a peace deal with Israel during this period is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
However, since no deal was concluded, it is not possible to make any inference from
this case regarding the expectation that deals concluded during periods of greater
opposition cohesiveness are more likely to be carried out than deals concluded when
the opposition is more divisive.
Furthermore, this case does not represent a strong test of Hypothesis 3, which
predicts that deals are more likely to be concluded with the stronger of the factions,
because no deal was made between Israel and either Palestinian faction. Netanyahu’s
statement, quoted above, suggests that Israel might have been willing to negotiate
with Fatah in 2011. If this is true, then we can turn to the JMCC opinion polls
from the same time to determine whether Israel’s overtures were to the stronger
groups. The JMCC poll of opinions in Palestine from April 2011, the same month
as Netanyahu’s statement, indicated greater trust of Fatah and stronger support
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for a Fatah-majority government in both the West Bank (27.2% for Fatah, 11.2%
for Hamas) and Gaza Strip (31% for Fatah, 15.4% for Hamas).4 In both areas the
strongest support was for a government of independent ministers. This suggests some
support for Hypothesis 3, conditional on Fatah being the stronger of the two factions
and on the actual willingness of Israel to negotiate with Fatah.
4.7 Evaluation & Conclusion
In this chapter I use four cases drawn from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to eval-
uate the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3. I
selected the four cases used in this chapter intentionally on the basis of their values
on the independent variables in order to ensure variation on those variables, which is
necessary in order to make any inference regarding causality (King, et. al. 1994).
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are complementary and can be evaluated together. Consistent
with both hypotheses, in the cases of greater divisiveness between factions (Cases 2
and 3), efforts at peace with at least one of the factions are made, while they are not
made in the cases of greater cohesion (Cases 1 and 4). However, since this means that
there were no peace agreements reached under high cohesiveness, it was not possible
to evaluate the second part of Hypothesis 1 - that is, the success with which such
an agreement was implemented. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are further supported by the
signing of peace agreements including Oslo I and II in Case 2 and the Geneva Accord
of 2003 when divisiveness was high, as well as by the fact that these agreements did
not produce a broad peace in implementation. Therefore, I can conclude that the
cases support the first half of Hypothesis 1, but I can make no conclusion regarding
the support for the second half of the hypothesis.
4Although in both territories a larger percentage (18.1% of the population of the combined
territories) of respondents supported cancellations of the Fatah-led government of the West Bank
and a return to the Hamas-led unity government than supported the reverse (10.3%).
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Hypothesis 3 is supported by negotiations between Israel and the stronger Pales-
tinian faction, Fatah, in Case 2 and in a more limited fashion by the negotiations at
Taba in Case 3. While Israel was clearly negotiating with the dominant Palestinian
actor during the 1990s, the relative power between Fatah and Hamas was more closely
balanced in Case 3. Evidence from public opinion polls concurrent with the Geneva
Accord indicate that Fatah may have been at least slightly more powerful at the
time. In Cases 1 and 4, the absence of negotiations prevents evaluation of Hypothesis
3 from these cases.
This analysis did not allow for a complete evaluation of all of the competing
hypotheses. However, through the design of the study, specifically the use of cases
drawn from a common context, I was able to control for several of the competing
explanations for the occurrence or implementation of a peace process by holding the
relevant explanatory variables constant across cases. This eliminated the possibility
that it was these controlled for variables (regime type of the target state, the salience
of ethnic or identity issues, the divisibility of stakes,5 presence of a mediator,6 and
factionalization7), rather than the hypothesized variables that produced the observed
results. Therefore, while I was unable to evaluate the effect of the controlled for
variables with this analysis, I was able to ensure that variation in their values did not
affect variation in the outcome of the cases.
The cost of war is identified in the previous literature as a variable likely to increase
the likelihood of a negotiated resolution to conflict. It is not possible to measure the
costs of conflict with precision in any of the cases, and it is reasonable to expect that
5It is possible that this variable could have taken a different value in Case 1 than in the remaining
cases due to the change in relevant factions. However, it will have been constant across the remaining
variables.
6Although the identity of the mediator may change, the presence of a mediator (or willing po-
tential mediator) is a constant across all cases.
7Again, the identity and exact number of factions varies across cases, but the number is always
greater than 5 - a cutpoint identified as significant in the theory supporting the hypothesis.
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these costs will have varied across the cases. Furthermore, it is reasonable (and, in
fact, consistent with the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3) to expect that
as the costs of conflict increase, the ability of the parties to conflict to find a point
within the bargaining range on which to settle improves due to the expansion of the
bargaining range. However, it seems unlikely that the costs of conflict decreased from
Case 3, in which bargains were struck (though implementation was unsuccessful), to
Case 4, in which agreements were not made. Although Case 3 saw the Second Intifada
and there were many suicide attacks and rockets and mortars launched into southern
Israel, Case 4 saw the Gaza War of 2009 (though Israeli costs, beyond public opinion)
and a continuation of missile attacks as well as other types of attack.8 That a deal
was struck in only one of these periods, despite similar costs of conflict, suggests that
some variable(s) other than cost of war is responsible for the change in outcomes.
Government and challenger parity is another of the variables taken from the al-
ternative hypotheses. Israel is clearly far more powerful than the Palestinians across
all periods - therefore, the parity variable is controlled for in that it is not present in
any case. However, this variable raises the specter of a related variable that ought
to be considered. This is the balance of power between the government and the
opposition. This variable, unlike the presence or absence of parity is not constant
across the cases. It is reasonable to speculate that the Israeli government in Case 1
might have negotiated over the future of the contested territories with Egypt rather
than the Palestinians because of the great weakness of the Palestinians in this pe-
riod - in other words, the Israeli government may have believed that the Palestinians
were not powerful enough to demand any concessions from the Israelis, and there-
fore the Israelis offered nothing. Although this is possible, I suggest that the Israelis
avoided negotiating with the Palestinians because the Palestinians were sufficiently
8Additionally, although missiles are a constant across the two periods, accuracy of such attacks
is increasing across time.
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unified that they would have required greater concessions than Israel hoped to make
and because Israel hoped to avoid increasing the legitimacy and popularity of Fatah
by recognizing it or the Fatah led PLO in negotiations when there were no viable
alternatives to it in Palestine.
The conflict over Palestine represents a crucial starting point for the analysis,
and provides support for the theory. Moving forward, it will be beneficial to also
test the Hypotheses 1 through 3 using data drawn from other cases. Testing against
different conflicts will allow for increased confidence that it is indeed the hypothesized
independent variables that produce change in the dependent variables - the occurrence
and outcome of peace negotiations - rather than some latent variable related to the
specific context of the conflict over Palestine. Furthermore, developing additional
case studies to evaluate the hypotheses will enable me to evaluate the second part of
Hypothesis 1, which suggests that when peace agreements are reached in cases of high
preference similarity they are more likely to be implemented than when similarity
is low. This can be done by purposefully selecting cases in which agreements are
reached and ensuring variation with regard to whether preference similarity is high
or low - for the purposes of testing only the second part of Hypotheses 1 and 2, this
method of case selection will be appropriate as I will be selecting the cases only on
the independent variables (since the dependent variable here is implementation of the
agreement, rather than negotiation of the agreement).
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
5.1 Summary
I began this project with the goal of understanding how the fragmentation of armed
opposition groups impacts the course of a conflict between such a group and the state
it targets and why it is that, given that violence tends to increase when states negoti-
ate with opposition factions, states and factions continue to negotiate. Because peace
talks can make the participating parties vulnerable to the attacks of non participating
groups and to defections by other participants, it would seem that most actors would
choose to avoid involvement in such talks where the opposition is factionalized. But,
because we observe negotiations in many conflicts with factionalized oppositions -
such as the conflict over Palestine discussed in Chapter 4, Northern Ireland, Sierra
Leone, Darfur, the civil war that ended with the establishment of Zimbabwe, and Iraq
to name only a few - we know that states and opposition factions do indeed engage
in negotiations despite the presence of factions within the opposition.
In the course of addressing this question of why states negotiate with factional-
ized insurgencies and the related question of how the presence of factions influences
the course of a civil conflict and its resolution, I considered the explanations pro-
posed in the extant literature on factionalization of armed opposition groups. Much
of this literature, which is reviewed in Chapter 2 along with the extant literature on
commitment problems, conceives of factions as being distinguished primarily along a
continuum ranging from moderate to extreme preferences or limited to total goals,
such that extremist factions - sometimes called greedy or intransigent factions - use
violence to disrupt negotiations (Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2002; Bueno de
Mesquita 2005). If some actors are intransigent or unwilling to accept any compro-
mise, then there may be no peaceful resolution of the conflict that is acceptable to
all sides. If some participants in civil conflicts hold these extreme preferences or are
unwilling to compromise while others have more moderate preferences or are more
willing to compromise on their objectives, then it follows that states would only nego-
tiate with those who did not hold extreme preferences (moderates) because attempts
at negotiating with extremists would always be foiled by their extremism. When the
state dealt with moderates, the extremists would be threatened by this either because
it might end the conflict from which they gained utility or because it would mean
compromising with the state on the issues at stake in the conflict. Extremists would
then use violence against the state to prevent or halt a deal between moderates and
the state. However, all of this presents a logical problem for prediction and expla-
nation of when violence is observed in response to negotiations. Namely, if behavior
(negotiating or attacking) is used to infer preferences (extreme or moderate), then we
cannot use the inferred preferences to explain that same behavior without introducing
an endogeneity problem.
Instead, in Chapter 2, I propose that civil conflict negotiations can be understood
using the same logic with which Fearon explains the occurrence of war between ra-
tional actors (1995). Fearon establishes that the absence of any power or central
governing body in the international system to prevent states from using force is not
a sufficient explanation for the occurrence of war. In other words, war does not occur
simply because there is not an external force to prevent its occurrence. Fearon estab-
lishes the existence and location of a bargaining space between states in dispute, and
then goes on to consider factors that would prevent rational states from arriving at
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a pre-war resolution within that space. That same bargaining space should logically
exist in civil conflicts or disputes as well as international ones. If this is so, then,
absent commitment problems, information problems, and resource indivisibility, civil
wars should be averted by peaceful agreements within the bargaining space (which is
to say with some regard to how each disputant could expect to fare in war and to the
anticipated destructiveness of war).1 In Chapter 2, I propose that the reason state
negotiations with a faction of a divided insurgency often produce violence is not that
the factions resorting to violence oppose peace generally, but that these factions are
threatened by the particular peace that is being or has been negotiated because it
neglects their interests or demands which may be substantively different from those of
the faction included in negotiations. This difference in preferences between factions
also prevents one faction from being able to credibly commit to protecting the inter-
ests of the excluded faction if it acquiesces to the peace deal because, if the factions
have substantively different preferences, then the factions receiving concessions will
prefer to keep those concessions for itself.
In Chapter 3, I develop a model of civil conflict resolution and spoiling in complete
and perfect information that does not rely on assumptions of extremist preferences,
unwillingness to negotiate, or very low costs of conflict. This opens the bargaining
space for peaceful resolutions to civil conflicts, even when factions are present. In
doing this, I allow factions to have preferences on any number of issues and capture
their net policy similarity through a single variable ranging from 0 to 1. This allows
factions that are excluded from a peace process to gain utility from concessions made
to their rivals in accordance with their degree of preference or policy similarity to that
rival. It also means that as factional similarity (or cohesiveness of the movement)
increases, both factions can anticipate higher payoffs from conflict because, though
1Walter (2002) has established that commitment problems in civil wars may be very difficult to
overcome without external intervention.
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they will be sharing the spoils of war in accordance with their power relationship,
when similarity is great, each faction will have greater utility for the other faction’s
policies - or distribution of spoils.2
This method of modeling the interaction between a state and a factionalized in-
surgency also introduces the potential for commitment problems between factions,
though these problems are not explicitly modeled in this dissertation (see Best and
Bapat 2012 for a model that does explicitly capture the commitment problem be-
tween factions). Specifically, in this model factions are assumed to have some value
for each other’s gains that is determined by their shared preferences. By dictating
that the value for another’s gains will be determined in such a way, the game does
not allow for non-credible offers of resource transfers (as these would not be carried
out in equilibrium anyway). But, it is the value of the shared policy preferences that
seems to determine when peace agreements are most likely to occur (when shared
preferences between factions are low) and when they are most likely to be fulfilled
(when shared preferences are high - which means that the interests of a faction ex-
cluded from the peace process will in fact be protected simply by the fact that those
interests coincide with the interests of the faction that was included in the process).
This suggests that the violence that disrupts peace processes often occurs because
the faction (or factions) excluded from the process does not gain enough from the
specific peace agreement that has been negotiated to cause that faction to prefer the
terms of the peace to the potential gains of continuing conflict (where these gains
include the chance of taking some territory by force or demanding some concessions
from the government). Therefore, if a faction included in negotiations were able to
2Recall from Chapter 3 that the degree of similarity, or value that each faction has for the other’s
gains, between factions is measured relative to the similarity in policy preferences that each faction
has with the state. In other words if the value of the variable capturing factional similarity is equal
to 0, then the factions’ values for each other’s policies is the same as their values for the policies of
the state. On the other hand, a similarity value of 1 indicates that the factions have exactly the
same policy preferences.
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guarantee protection of the excluded faction’s interests in exchange for that faction’s
disarmament, then violence aimed at spoiling the peace might be avoided. However,
in many cases such guarantees cannot be made credible.
From the formal model in Chapter 3, I derive three hypotheses. The first two
are referenced in the previous paragraph - they predict that when similarity between
factions is high, peace agreements are less likely to be signed than when the divisions
between factions are greater, but when similarity is high, agreements that are made
will be more likely to be successfully implemented than those made when similarity is
low. The third hypothesis indicates that states facing factionalized insurgencies are
more likely to make peace agreements with the more powerful faction.
In Chapter 4, I draw four distinct cases from the history of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict that show variation on the two independent variables described above - fac-
tional parity and factional divisiveness. I use these cases to develop a comparative
case study through which I evaluate the three hypotheses derived from the formal
model in Chapter 3. Through these cases I am able to establish empirical support for
the three hypotheses. The exception to this is in the second component of the first
hypothesis which indicates that when agreements are signed in times of low factional
divisiveness (i.e. high factional similarity), they are more likely than those signed
under high levels of factional divisiveness to produce a broad peace. This part of
Hypothesis 1 could not be evaluated using the cases in Chapter 4 because in neither
of the cases in which factional divisiveness was low was a peace agreement signed.
However, the absence of peace agreements in such periods is, in itself, consistent with
Hypothesis 1.
To provide a more complete evaluation of the empirical support for the hypotheses,
it will be necessary to extend the case study analysis to other cases in which states
have faced factionalized oppositions. For the purposes of this analysis however, the
use of four cases drawn from the same long-running conflict allowed for the best
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possible test of the hypotheses since many contextual elements were held constant
across all four cases, resulting in a high degree of comparability across cases. Using
these cases also allowed me to control for several alternative explanations of when
peace agreements are most likely to be reached or implemented.
5.2 Tentative Policy Implications
This project has multiple implications for policy decisions regarding when and how to
negotiate with factionalized oppositions. While these implications will require more
research to develop thoroughly, it is possible to discuss a few of them on a tentative
basis.
First, the model suggests that, rather than hurting states chances for reconciliation
of civil conflicts, there may be times when states can benefit from the divisions within
insurgencies. Specifically, when factions are somewhat divided in their goals and
preferences, this lowers each faction’s utility for continuing conflict. In such cases, the
government may be able to dissuade a faction from continuing to fight by making it an
offer of concessions which it will prefer to the utility of fighting (given that divergence
in preferences among the opposition factions has made fighting less attractive than
if the factions were perfectly aligned in their preferences). Once the government has
made a deal with one opposition faction, the other faction no longer has the option of
continuing the status quo (conflict between the state and both factions). If the faction
excluded from negotiations is aware that the government will retract the concessions
if it observes continuing violence, then the excluded faction may acquiesce to the
peace agreement rather than continue to fight on its own, even if its preferences are
not perfectly aligned with those of the faction that has received the concessions. This
is because, in such cases, if the excluded faction acquiesces to the deal it will receive
some value for the concessions - even though that value will not be as high as the
value of the concessions to the included faction. On the other hand, if the excluded
faction continues fighting, it will bare the costs of conflict, will lose any utility for
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the concessions, and will be less likely to win anything for itself since the faction that
accepted the offer will be disarmed.
Second, this project suggests that, where factions of an insurgency have very
different preferences, it may be difficult to reach a broader peaceful resolution of the
conflict without mechanisms to ensure that the interests of each faction is protected
once the factions have disarmed. In this way, it may be that barriers to intra-group
conflict resolution mirror those to conflicts between states and insurgents. Walter
(2002) found that commitment problems in civil conflicts meant that these conflicts
could not often be resolved without the presence of third-party intervenors - it may
be that the same is true for conflicts between opposition factions. If so, then this
may be a more difficult problem to solve within factions than it is between an armed
opposition and a state. Where intervenors are required to protect the interests of
factions from each other, the state will not be able to act as a credible guarantor of
any agreement as the factions will not trust the state. However, the presence of an
outside intervenor will require the agreement of the target state to avoid violations
of sovereignty.
Third, as Hypothesis 3 indicates, states that hope to achieve peace at the lowest
cost are advised to negotiate with the more powerful faction. While it might seem that
the loyalty of weaker factions could be bought at a lower price, weaker factions will
be less effective at constraining violence from their stronger rivals. Furthermore, the
rivals will not acquiesce to peace unless they expect to gain as much from the terms
of the peace as they could expect to gain from continuing to fight. This means that,
unless the factions have perfectly similar policy preferences, the government would
need to make greater concessions to the weaker faction in order for these concessions
to persuade the more powerful faction to acquiesce. Therefore, states that seek an
end to civil conflict with all opposition factions should negotiate with the strongest
faction.
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Fourth, Hypotheses 1 and 2 indicate that states can predict when they are most
likely to be able to get signed agreements with an insurgent faction and when such
agreements should be most likely to produce a broader peace. In the model, the degree
of policy similarity between factions is exogenous and is not in any way influenced
by the state. However, even in the model, it is assumed that the policy similarity
of the factions is measured relative to the factions’ similarity to the state, which is
normalized to zero. This in turn suggests that states do have some ability to influence
the similarity between factions. Though it is outside the context of the model, it may
be that states can manipulate factional divisions through the issues that they chose to
make salient through their own policies, through the nature of any concessions they
may make, or through rhetoric. By increasing the salience of the issues that divide
the factions or by using state resources to advantage one faction and its agenda to
the detriment of another, states may be able to increase (or decrease) the divisions
between factions. This possible implication is sufficiently far outside the scope of the
present project that it will demand further research before it can be asserted with
any real confidence. However, it is not immediately clear how one would approach
operationalizing such things as increased salience of a given issue or state attempts
at increasing the salience of an issue.
Finally, this project suggests that it is time for both policy makers and researchers
to begin looking beyond the overly simplistic terminology of extremist and moderate
terrorists or insurgents. If it is true that violence aimed at spoiling peace talks and
agreements is the result of a commitment problem - of a difference in the substance of
factional preferences rather than the intensity with which those preferences are held,
the costs of conflict, or any preference for violence - then attributing such violence
to immutable characteristics of the factions that use the violence creates an incorrect
impression that those factions which have used violence to disrupt negotiations cannot
be negotiated with successfully. This risks cutting off possible routes to a peaceful
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resolution of conflict when the costliness of civil conflict necessitates the consideration
of all available routes to resolution.
5.3 Avenues for Future Research
This project raises many avenues for future research and development. By moving
away from the conception of opposition factions as being either moderate or extreme
and instead allowing insurgent factions to have diverse opinions on many different
issues, this project captures the potential for a commitment problem of varying in-
tensity between insurgent factions. This suggests a particularly vital area for further
consideration. It is unlikely that there are very many if any factionalized insurgencies
in which the factions are truly divided only by the intensity of their preference for
a common good or their costs for fighting. This project demonstrates that changing
these assumptions does in fact affect the conclusions derived from models of attempts
at conflict resolution with factionalized insurgencies. Therefore, we can conclude that
continuing to model insurgent factions as if they were only divided by their intensity
of preference (or costs of conflict or intransigence or greediness or any similar dimen-
sion) risks not only wasting time and effort, but risks making inappropriate policy
recommendations regarding both the prospects for peace in such conflicts and the
route by which such a peace can be reached.
In Chapter 3, I develop a model of negotiations between a state and a factional-
ized insurgency in complete information and without considering the potential for a
state to make counter offers to the included faction’s rivals in the event that its first
offer is rejected. In practice, while a long running civil conflict may provide many
opportunities for states and insurgent factions to develop reasonably well informed
estimates of their relative levels of strength, we may still expect that the “fog of war”
and the speed with which factional strength can fluctuate (one need only look at the
public opinion polls conducted in Palestine to see that factional support at least is
not always constant, even if the actual number of fighters is fairly stable) may lead to
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a greater degree of uncertainty regarding relative levels of strength than my model as-
sumes. More significant is the assumption that the cost to a government of defecting
on an agreement is common knowledge among the state and the opposition factions.
Even a small degree of uncertainty on this point could be expected to produce equi-
libria in which the state defects on agreements (such equilibria do not exist in the
complete information model because non credible offers - that is offers in which the
state, having promised to transfer territory or other resources to the included faction
in exchange for that faction tying its fighting capabilities to those of the government
such that it will be unable to fight without the government, does not make good on
the promised concessions in the event of violence and leaves its negotiating partner
effectively disarmed - are not accepted when they will lead to violence from excluded
factions; although included factions may accept non credible offers in complete infor-
mation, they only do so when they know that the excluded faction, recognizing that
the offer is not credible and that the concessions will therefore only be available if the
excluded faction discontinues violence, will acquiesce to the peace).
The model in Chapter 3 indicates that the government is always indifferent be-
tween war and fulfilling an accepted offer of concessions in the face of violence. How-
ever, in practice there may be additional incentives for making and fulfilling a deal.
States that rely on foreign aid either from other states with an interest in the outcome
of the conflict or from international organizations may have additional incentives to
make peace agreements with opposition factions - even if the state knows that those
peace agreements will lead to violence from excluded factions and that it will be
compelled by circumstances to fulfill its deal in the face of this violence. Even states
that do not rely on aid may be subject to such pressures if threats of international
sanctions or boycotts are credible. Further research into the effects of international
pressure on the potential for states to make deals that they know will be met with
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violence from those excluded is warranted. This is particularly relevant since the ev-
idence indicates that many attempts at peace are met with increased violence, which
raises further questions regarding how we can predict when states will be likely to
make deals, even though they expect those deals to be met with violence.
A further area warranting additional consideration is the reasons that states nego-
tiate with weaker factions. Although the cases in Chapter 4 show no evidence of such
deals, empirically we can observe that states do sometimes negotiate with weaker
factions. There are a few possible explanations for this (including one proposed in
Cunningham 2011) that deserve additional attention in the literature. If a general
peace is more costly than war, a state may consider a partial peace - an offer that the
included faction will accept but that the excluded faction will oppose. Factions only
accept offers that would give them an expected utility at least as great as they would
get for rejecting the offer and moving to conflict. This means that it is costly for a
government to buy off powerful factions - factions that are able to wrest more territory
from the government and to do so at a lower cost to themselves. Less powerful fac-
tions have a lower expected utility for conflict because, given the method of dividing
spoils according to ex ante resources, these factions cannot expect to gain much even
if the insurgency defeats the government. This means that the cooperation of weaker
factions may be bought at a lower cost. However, if a weaker faction anticipates that
the stronger faction will retaliate against a peace agreement, then it will demand a
greater concession than if the stronger faction were expected to acquiesce. Further,
if a weak faction anticipates that the excluded faction will use violence and that the
state will renege on its deal, then the weak faction will prefer not to accept an offer
of concessions as doing so will leave the weak faction in a worse position than war.
We can anticipate that as the weak faction’s belief that the state intends to fulfill on
a peace agreement in the event of conflict increases, the faction becomes more open
to accepting a deal that it knows will provoke retaliation. However, since the state
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in this model is indifferent between fulfilling a deal and making no deal at all, unless
there are other incentives to the state for negotiating, the weak faction might take
any offer made when the excluded faction will not acquiesce as an indication that the
government will not fulfill its offer.
States may negotiate with a weaker faction when they are not seeking a full peace,
but instead want to divide the factions against each other by offering some limited
resources or favor to one of the factions in order to affect the power balance of factions
inciting competition or to create the appearance that one faction is more effective than
another. It could be argued that this was the goal of Israel’s unilateral decision to
withdraw from the Gaza Strip in 2005, demanding no concessions from Hamas in
exchange. Gaza was already a Hamas stronghold, and it may have been that Israel,
not anticipating Hamas’ 2006 electoral victory, believed that such a withdrawal would
give Hamas a temporary boost in support that would push Fatah to the bargaining
table on terms more favorable to Israel - that a bump in Hamas’ support would
raise pressure on Fatah to produce results for the West Bank. The in-fighting that
results from state manipulation of opposition factions may minimize anti-government
violence and potentially lead the insurgency to collapse on its own. Further research
into this possibility is warranted due to the possible implications of state manipulation
of vulnerable populations and because the fact that states continue on occasion to
attempt negotiations with weaker factions3 indicates that there are advantages to
doing so that have not yet been fully theorized.
Finally, the model developed in Chapter 3 assumes that governments will fulfill
all offers that are not met by violence (that is, if the excluded faction acquiesces to
the agreement between the government and the rival faction, then the government
3For example, Rhodesian President Ian Smith approached Joseph Nkomo, head of the second
largest opposition faction ZAPU for negotiations and, when Nkomo refused, Smith turned to a
much weaker rival, Muzorewa of the marginalized United African National Congress in Rhodesia.
Although Smith concluded a deal with Muzorewa, the UANC was not sufficiently powerful to impose
the peace term that Smith desired.
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will fulfill the terms of the agreement with certainty). As established in Chapter 3,
factions will not accept agreements that are sure to be abdicated. However, Chapter 3
also establishes that allowing for the possibility of reneging does change the equilibria
of the model. In the model developed in Chapter 3, included factions are more likely
to accept and excluded factions are more likely to acquiesce to an offer of a given
size if that offer is not credible (i.e. the government would retract the offer in the
event of violence). Working backward, we can see that excluded factions will be
more willing to accept non-credible offers because the payoff to an excluded faction
of continuing conflict in the presence of a non-credible offer of a given value is lower
than the payoff to doing so in the presence of a credible offer of the same value, while
in both cases the payoff to acquiescing is found by weighting the offer by the degree of
common preferences between the factions. In turn, given that the value of an offer at
least compensates the included faction for the net gains it could expect from conflict,
the included faction will accept a non-credible offer only if the excluded faction will
acquiesce.
In the future, it may be worthwhile to consider allowing for the possibility of
defection even in the event that a peace deal does not produce violence - that is
when both factions accept the term of peace and disarm (or restructure their armed
wings such that they cannot operate independently of the state). Although we should
not expect that allowing for reneging in this area would produce actual reneging in
situations of complete information, without formalizing the interaction, it is difficult
to say what other effects allowing for the possibility of reneging at this node would
have. Bueno de Mesquita has suggested that without a faction remaining armed, a
targeted government may have no incentive to uphold its end of a bargain with the
faction with which it is negotiating (2005), suggesting that it is in precisely those
cases where all factions accept peace that we are most likely to see reneging from the
state. There are of course other mechanisms by which to ensure the credibility of the
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government. For example, Walter establishes the significance of third party security
guarantees which would prevent one sided defection (2002). Of course, where a state
is dependent on the good will of other concerned states or international organizations,
it may not require a third party security guarantee. Indeed, I expect that if a target
state anticipates that it would lose international, third party, or even domestic support
that is vital to its own interests in the event it was seen defecting on an agreement
that would otherwise produce peace, the state may be dissuaded from defection.
Unilateral state defection may have the effect of generating ill will in the international
community, causing a state to appear unwilling to cease costly civil conflict, and
contributing to a reputation of being a non-credible bargaining partner (relevant in
situations of incomplete information). This suggests that the cost for defecting on a
peace agreement when the opposition factions have accepted the terms may be much
higher than when an opposition faction is attempting to spoil peace. While previous
work has considered the effect of a commitment problem between the state and its
negotiating partner - whereby the state cannot credibly commit not to abdicate an
agreement as soon as its partner disarms - there may be many useful insights to be
gained from considering the effects of this commitment problem simultaneously with
those of the commitment problem between the factions of an opposition group.
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